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The Psychology of Patent Protection
STEPHANIE PLAMONDON BAIR
This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of the major
justifications for our patent system using a behavioral psychology
framework. Applying insights from the behavioral literature that I argue
more accurately account for the realities of human action than previous
analytical tools, I critically evaluate each of the major justifications for
patents—incentive theory, disclosure theory, prospect theory,
commercialization theory, patent racing theory, and non-utilitarian
theories. I ask whether our current patent system is an effective regime for
meeting the stated goals of these accounts. When the answer to this
question is no, I again turn to the behavioral literature to provide
suggestions for how we might better achieve these goals. The results of this
analysis suggest that our current patent system is best justified under the
commercialization account. Surprisingly, my analysis also suggests that
many of the behaviors and outcomes we hope to encourage through
patents might more effectively be accomplished using less socially costly
non-financial incentives.
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The Psychology of Patent Protection
STEPHANIE PLAMONDON BAIR*
I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights, including patent rights, play a significant
role in the American innovation landscape. But why, exactly, do we grant
patent monopolies?
To begin to answer this question, imagine that you are an inventor,
working independently or as a founder of a small start-up company. What
role, if any, does the patent system play in your decision-making as you
proceed through the creative process?
Maybe the prospect of a patent provides the financial encouragement
you need to invent something in the first place—a patent will allow you to
protect your intellectual labor and hopefully make some money from your
idea. Or maybe it encourages you to share the details of your invention
with others—you would prefer to keep your idea secret, but choose to
reveal it in exchange for the limited monopoly and corresponding financial
returns a patent promises. Perhaps the prospect of monopoly profits will
encourage you to make, or help you attract, the investments needed to turn
your idea into a marketable product. Or maybe you would conceive,
disclose, and commercialize your idea even without the patent incentive,
but you nevertheless think that your idea deserves protection because you
are personally attached to it, or because you believe it is a just reward for
your contribution to society.
These are some of the reasons scholars have given to explain why we
grant patent monopolies. But how can we know if our patent system
actually works in the way these theories suggest? For instance, consider the
predominant justification for the patent system: that a patent encourages
people to invent things they would not invent without a patent. How can
we know whether this actually happens in a typical case?
Patent scholars have traditionally answered this question using
economic analyses, which assume that actors within the system behave

*
Associate Professor of Law, BYU Law School. Thank you to Hank Greely, Matthew Jennejohn,
Dmitry Karshtedt, Lucas Osborn, Gordon Smith, David Studdart, participants in the 2015 Works in
Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at The George Washington University Law School, and
participants in the Stanford Law School Fellows Workshop for valuable input on earlier drafts.

300

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:297

1

rationally. Indeed, many of the justifications for patents were developed
based on this assumption.
But it is well known that people do not behave like rational actors.2 In
fact, a vast behavioral psychology literature reveals that people repeatedly
depart from rational utility-maximizing behavior, and that they do so in
predictable ways.3 Many of these well-studied behavioral trends take place
in creative and innovative contexts. The behavioral literature, then, offers
an alternative way to evaluate patent theories.
The time is ripe for reevaluating these justifications as the traditional
view that patent rights optimally promote innovation is being challenged
from a number of directions. Scholars, practitioners, and inventors in the
software industry argue that strong patent rights may hinder rather than
encourage innovation in their field.4 Commentators point to areas of
endeavor where innovation flourishes without intellectual property
protection.5 And patent trolls, who reap benefits from the patent regime
without contributing the social value the system is meant to encourage,
have caused many to question our current approach.6 Perhaps in response
to these concerns, the Supreme Court has accepted an increased number of
recent patent cases, and has decided these cases in ways that generally
narrow the scope and availability of patent rights.7

1
See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (explaining the economic
basis of the predominant incentive theory of intellectual property).
2
See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989) (noting that an assumption of
rationality exaggerates the actual cognitive capacities of humans).
3
See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS xix–xx (2010) (arguing that humans act in predictably irrational ways in their economic
reasoning and actions).
4
See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
198 (2011); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5–6 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovati
onrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6LH-TR5R] (arguing that patents suppress productive competition among
firms).
5
See, e.g., Aarthi S. Anand, “Less is More”: New Property Paradigm in the Information Age?,
11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 65, 69 (2012) (discussing software development as an area where innovation
has flourished without strong intellectual property protection); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual
Property’s Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 447–48 (2013)
(discussing intellectual property’s “negative-space”: areas of creation and innovation that thrive with
little to no patent protection).
6
See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117, 2172–80 (2013) (suggesting that trolls are a sign of a flawed patent system that warrants
systemic reform).
7
See Jeremy Elman, 6 Key Decisions: Patent Year in Review, FLA. BUS. REV. (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202679187906/6-Key-Decisions-Patent-Year-in-Review
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Given the current distrust of patent rights, a renewed and
comprehensive look at the various theoretical justifications for these rights
is in order. Why do we grant patents? What do we hope to accomplish by
doing so, and how?
After discussing the standard theoretical answers to these questions,
this Article critically evaluates each of the theories—including incentive,
disclosure, prospect, commercialization, patent racing, and non-utilitarian
theories—using a behavioral approach that arguably more accurately
accounts for the realities of human action than previous analytical tools.
Applying this approach, this Article examines whether our current patent
system is the most effective system for meeting the stated goals of these
theories.
The behavioral framework used here offers insights into patent theories
beyond what previously has been obtainable from traditional economic or
rights-based analyses. For utilitarian theories, many of which invoke
incentives to engage in innovation-optimizing behaviors (like invention,
disclosure, and commercialization), the potential contribution of behavioral
research is straightforward. Simply put, this work can help us understand
whether individuals can be expected to respond to particular incentives in
the way these theories propose. For non-utilitarian theories, many of which
are focused on the rights of inventors, behavioral research can help us
evaluate these theories in part by telling us whether our current system
honors the interests implicated by the theories in a psychologically
meaningful way.
This is not the first Article that has sought to examine one or more
patent theories, or that has incorporated behavioral insights into its
analysis. But it is the first to comprehensively evaluate the major theories
of patent protection using a behavioral framework. This Article adds to the
growing literature that incorporates findings from psychology and
sociology into analyses of intellectual property policy8—a developing
trend that is consistent with similar movements in other areas of the law,
and is based on the recognition that classical law and economics theory
(noting that the six patent cases on the Supreme Court’s 2014 docket represent the highest number of
patent cases the Court has heard in one term).
8
See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 142 (2008); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (2010); William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44
CONN. L. REV. 369, 374 (2011); Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process:
Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2002
(2011) [hereinafter Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process]; Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus
Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 283, 286 (2010); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 813, 816.
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does not capture the full complexity of human behavior.
From the perspective of this Article, the end goal of the behavioral
analysis is a utilitarian one. Ultimately, many would agree that we want a
patent system that will maximize social value at minimal social cost. This
Article demonstrates that a behavioral analysis can help us achieve this
system in two ways. First, it can tell us whether we actually can expect our
current patent system to achieve the goals proposed by each of the various
theories. Second, if the answer to the first question is no for a given theory,
the analysis can give us clues as to how we might better achieve that
particular goal. Although behavioral research cannot tell us what the goal
of the patent system should be (that is a normative question the theories
themselves attempt to answer), it can, in the two ways mentioned, help
guide us towards the patent system we claim to want.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I provide an overview of
the various utilitarian and non-utilitarian accounts of the patent system.
Part III forms the bulk of the Article; in it I examine each of the
justifications for patents in light of relevant behavioral research, including
work that has not previously been discussed in the intellectual property
context. Based on this analysis, I conclude that the patent system in its
current form is best structured to incentivize commercialization—the goal
proposed by commercialization theory. In contrast, according to this
inquiry, many of the ends proposed by the other theories do not justify our
current system. The analysis reveals, however, that many of these goals—
including promoting disclosure and productive competition—could be
achieved by switching the focus of the patent system for early inventions
from a primarily financial reward to a primarily attributional reward. In
Part IV, I discuss the prescriptions that flow from my findings in the
previous Parts.
II. ACCOUNTS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
Scholars have offered various justifications for the intellectual
property system generally and the patent system in particular. The majority
of commentators focus on utilitarian accounts that employ primarily
economic arguments to explain why patents encourage optimal levels of
9
See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 23 (arguing generally that insights from psychology and
sociology can be used to enrich classical law and economics analyses); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1057–58 (2000) (describing the development of “law and behavioral science”
theory, which borrows from psychological and sociocultural theories, as a response to the shortcomings
of rational choice theory); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1998) (reviewing
the substantive fields in which legal scholars have applied insights from behavioral decision-making
research).
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innovation. Additionally, non-utilitarian defenses that seek to justify the
patent system as a means of promoting goals and values beyond innovation
have been proposed. In this Part, I provide a brief overview of the principal
accounts.
A. Utilitarian Accounts
1. Incentive Theory
The chief justification for the patent system is the so-called incentive
theory. According to this theory, patents are necessary to efficiently
incentivize the production of new ideas.10 This is so because ideas, unlike
most physical property, are public goods: they are both non-rivalrous
(meaning that they can be consumed simultaneously by more than one
person) and non-excludable (meaning that one cannot effectively exclude
others from their use).11 Thus, once an individual produces an invention,
incurring invention costs and production costs in the process, others can
copy it while incurring only the production costs.12 The result is that it is
generally cheaper to copy someone else’s idea than it is to create your own
idea from scratch.13
Because the costs of copying are less than the costs of initial creation,
copiers can sell their products at a lower cost than inventors, making it
difficult for inventors to recoup the full costs of invention.14 Under this
account, rational market players have every incentive to be copiers rather
than inventors—to “free ride” on the larger expenditures and efforts of
inventors.15
According to incentive theory, patents overcome these market
problems by granting limited-term monopolies to inventors.16 This allows
10
See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004) (explaining that without intellectual property protection, people
would copy rather than create ideas).
11
See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
11 (3d ed. 2003) (“Information has the characteristics of what economists call a ‘public good’—it may
be ‘consumed’ by many people without depletion, and it is difficult to identify those who will not pay
and prevent them from using the information.”); Fisher, supra note 1, at 169 (“The distinctive
characteristic of most intellectual products . . . [is] that they are easily replicated and that enjoyment of
them by one person does not prevent enjoyment of them by other persons.”); Johnson, supra note 8, at
631–32 (explaining that ideas are “copyable goods” that are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable).
12
See Fisher, supra note 1, at 169 (explaining that copyists incur only low costs of production
when distributing products based on an inventor’s original idea).
13
See Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 453 (“An underlying premise of the utilitarian approach is that
copying costs less than initial creation.”).
14
See Fisher, supra note 1, at 169 (explaining that since copyists bear only the costs of
production, they can offer products identical to the invention at very low prices).
15
See Johnson, supra note 8, at 629 (explaining that the public can take a “free ride” on the labor
of persons who create nonrivalrous and nonexcludable goods).
16
See Fisher, supra note 1, at 169 (explaining that the patent system increases economic
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inventors to recoup the full costs of invention by charging higher prices for
their creations.17 It also provides market players with the necessary
incentives to become inventors: because they can charge a premium for
their goods, the payoff for inventors is potentially greater than that for
copiers.18
As Eric Johnson notes, the incentive theory may owe its popularity to
the fact that it is logically appealing.19 It is also the account of intellectual
property given in the Constitution. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the
power to “secur[e] for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries” for the purpose of
“promot[ing] the progress of science and useful arts.”20
2. Disclosure Theory
In contrast to incentive theory, disclosure theory does not presume that
patents are necessary to incentivize invention.21 Instead, this theory posits
that inventors will solve the problems that arise from the non-rivalrous,
non-excludable nature of ideas by maintaining secrecy over their
inventions.22
But secrecy brings its own potential economic problems. In particular,
it might inhibit downstream innovation by those who would otherwise be
expected to build on the discoveries of the secret-keeping inventor.23
Secrecy could also, due to increased transaction costs, deter the
economically beneficial practice of licensing.24
According to disclosure theory, then, a patent provides an inventor not
efficiency by granting creators the exclusive right to copy).
17
Id.
18
See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 31 (2011) (“[W]ithout an intellectual property regime that reserves for
copyright owners any profits that can be gleaned from their work over an extensive time span, potential
authors would lack adequate motivation to create in the first place . . . .”).
19
See Johnson, supra note 8, at 634 (positing that the “irresistible logic” of incentive theory has
caused it to be enshrined in the U.S. Constitution).
20
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of
Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1038 (1998).
22
Id. at 1039. An alternate conception of the theory envisions disclosure as a complement to
incentive theory. Under this conception, the patent provides the primary incentive to innovate, but
disclosure is an added benefit reaped by the public. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (arguing that patents benefit society economically because they reward
inventors for both inventing and disclosing information to the public); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of
the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 745 (2012) (“The benefit the public gets from the bargain,
on [disclosure] theory, is not (or not just) a new invention but the publication of new learning that
might otherwise have been kept secret.”).
23
See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1039 (elaborating on the notion that the inventor
who keeps all relevant information secret cannot exploit all possible uses of the invention).
24
See id. at 1039 (explaining that “secrecy in general is less effective as a means of appropriating
returns from product invention.”).
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with an incentive to invent, but with an incentive to disclose the invention
once she has created it. This theory is sometimes framed as a contract the
inventor enters into with society.25 In consideration for a patent, the
inventor discloses her invention to the public.26
Society reaps the benefits of this bargain with inventors in several
ways. First, the public is free to use the information disclosed in the patent
after the patent has expired, whereas if the patent had not issued, the
information might have remained secret indefinitely.27 Second, the patent
disclosure might spur innovation even during the life of the patent, as
others attempt to design around the patent, improve on the disclosed
invention, or are inspired by the disclosed information to create something
new.28 Third, transaction costs of licensing are lowered because potential
licensees are made aware of the existence of the invention, the parties in
possession of the invention, and important details about precisely what the
invention entails.29
Disclosure theory is often endorsed by the courts as a justification for
the patent system. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, reviewed a series of Supreme Court cases that characterized a
patent as a “quid pro quo” given to the patentee in exchange for
disclosure.30 She explained that “immediate disclosure . . . from[] the
patentee . . . is the price paid for the exclusivity secured.”31 The Federal
Circuit endorsed this theory in Enzo BioChem v. Gen-Probe when it
explained that a patent’s written description requirement fulfills “the quid
pro quo of the patent system; the public must receive meaningful
disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for
a limited period of time.”32
3. Prospect Theory
Incentive and disclosure theories focus on influencing behavior that
occurs prior to invention. Prospect theory, in contrast, concerns itself with
behavior that takes place after the initial inventive steps have been taken.33
Edmund Kitch, the first proponent of the theory, compared a field of
invention to a mining prospect.34 He argued that just as a mining claim is
25

E.g., Lemley, supra note 22, at 745.
Id.
27
Fromer, supra note 22, at 548.
28
Id. at 548–49.
29
See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1034 (arguing that patents reduce the transaction
costs involved in licensing an invention).
30
537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003).
31
Id.
32
323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
33
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269
(1977).
34
Id. at 266.
26
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given to a single firm for reasons of efficiency, so too should a broad
patent be granted to an inventor to manage his invention and control
further innovation within the field.35
Prospect theory does not speak to the incentives that might be required
to stimulate invention in the first place. It does, however, seek to provide
the initial inventor with the incentive to efficiently use his invention and
pursue additional innovation in the same field.36 The incentive is
commensurate with the scope of the patent, which Kitch asserted should be
broad.37
Under prospect theory, exclusive rights to a broad field are given to the
initial inventor for two reasons. First, the theory assumes that free
development and exploitation of an invention once it has been created and
disclosed, such as might take place if patent rights are defined narrowly,
would lead to duplication and waste.38 This waste might show itself in the
form of patent races where multiple parties compete to obtain a patent on
an improvement of the original invention.39 Second, prospect theory
assumes the initial inventor is in the best position to improve on the
original invention.40
Although prospect theory has been widely debated in the academic
literature, it is not often cited by the courts or by Congress as a goal of the
patent system. Elements of prospect theory have arisen in the copyright
context, however, via the congressional call for longer copyright terms in
the Copyright Term Extension Act.41 As argued by proponents, that
legislation, enacted in 1998,42 provides incentives to copyright owners to
continue preserving, producing, and distributing their previous creations.43
4. Commercialization Theory
Like prospect theory, commercialization theory also addresses
behavior that occurs after an invention has been conceived.44 But unlike
35

Id. at 271–75.
Lemley, supra note 22, at 738–39.
37
Kitch, supra note 33, at 267.
38
Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1042.
39
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 307–
08 (1992) (discussing the patent system’s compromise of granting protection broad enough to serve the
system’s purposes, but not so broad as to encourage wasteful patent races); see also Kitch, supra note
33, at 269–71.
40
See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1042 (describing prospect theory’s assumption that
a broad patent promotes development in a structured manner). But see Lemley, supra note 22, at 740–
41 (questioning this assumption).
41
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208, 222 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term Extension
Act); Lemley, supra note 10, at 134–35.
42
See Lemley, supra note 10, at 134–35; Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
43
See Lemley, supra note 10, at 134–35.
44
Lemley, supra note 22, at 738–39.
36
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prospect theory, which focuses on eliminating socially wasteful patent
races, commercialization theory focuses on the patent as an incentive for
inventors to develop their ideas and, ultimately, bring them to market.45
As Ted Sichelman explains, commercialization theory recognizes that
“conception is more of a process than an event,” and a number of steps
beyond the initial idea are generally required before a creation is ready for
public consumption.46 Because the economic benefits flowing from
innovation largely depend on inventions reaching the public in usable
form,47 the theory focuses on the patent system as a means of providing
adequate incentives for each of these essential steps.48
According to this theory’s proponents, the patent system has the
potential to facilitate commercialization in several ways. First, adequate
patent incentives can encourage the original inventor to do what is
necessary to bring the creation to market and reap the rewards of the patent
monopoly.49 If the original inventor does not have the resources to perform
the post-inventive development activities required to bring a product to
market, a patent may also facilitate transferring the invention to a larger or
more specialized firm for commercialization.50 If the inventor does decide
to single-handedly undertake commercialization, a patent may facilitate the
patentee’s search for development and commercialization funding.51 While
some commercialization proponents focus on justifying the current patent
system via a commercialization account, others have suggested reforms
that would more effectively advance commercialization’s goals, including
a new, commercialization-focused patent.52
Commercialization has recently been cited by the Federal Circuit as a
45
Michael Abramowicz, The Dangers of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1065, 1073–76 (2007); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 347–53
(2010).
46
Sichelman, supra note 45, at 349–52 (noting that these steps might include making a prototype,
market testing, marketing, and distribution).
47
Id. at 377–78.
48
See id. at 350–54 (describing the phases of work typically required to make commercial use of
a patent).
49
See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697, 707–08 (2001).
50
Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1040.
51
See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 227, 241–43 (2012) (noting how two goals of the patent system articulated in commercialization
theory—(1) facilitating transfer of an invention and (2) fundraising for commercialization purposes—
are a solution to the “disclosure paradox”—the reticence of inventors to reveal important information to
parties capable of helping to commercialize it for fear of having their ideas stolen); see also Arti Kaur
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 77, 121–22 (1999). This Article focuses exclusively on the financial incentive strain, rather
than the disclosure paradox strains, of commercialization theory.
52
Compare Kieff, supra note 49, at 707–08 (justifying the current system in terms of
commercialization), with Sichelman, supra note 45, at 400–09 (proposing a separate commercialization
patent for those who commit to developing and selling a product).
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goal of the patent system. In Fresenius USA v. Baxter International, the
court stated that “[t]he system of patents is founded on providing an
incentive for the creation, development, and commercialization of new
technology.”53
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which allows universities to obtain
patents on the fruits of publicly funded research, also reflects
commercialization concerns.54 Section 200 of the Act states that “[i]t is the
policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote
the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development . . . [and] the commercialization and public availability of
inventions made in the United States by United States industry and
labor.”55
5. Patent Racing Theory
Under prospect theory, patent races are viewed as an inefficient
outcome remedied by granting an initial inventor control over
improvements and subsequent innovations in the field.56 In contrast, Mark
Lemley argues that patent races may perform an important function, and
that a patent’s role in encouraging these races provides an independent
theoretical justification for the patent system.57
According to this theory, inventors do not necessarily need the
incentive of the patent to invent in the first instance.58 The fact that a patent
is available, however, will tend to speed the pace of innovation as
individuals and groups literally race for the patent prize.59 Inventors may
engage in these races because they want the monopoly reward a patent
brings or because they fear being excluded from or taxed for the use of
their own inventions if someone else patents them.60
Although the traditional interpretation is that patent racing is
economically wasteful, Lemley argues that this view may be overstated.61
A race to obtain a patent for a given invention will necessarily involve
some duplication of effort, but because innovation is a trial-and-error
process, independent groups working towards the same goal will likely
adopt different approaches.62 These differences in approach may lead to
53

Fresenius USA v. Baxter Int’l, 733 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); see
also Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 21, at 1041.
55
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 § 200 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012)).
56
Grady & Alexander, supra note 39, at 307; see also Kitch, supra note 33, at 269–70.
57
Lemley, supra note 22, at 750–51, 757.
58
Id. at 736–37.
59
Id. at 752–53.
60
Id. at 755–56.
61
Id. at 752–53.
62
Id. at 753–54.
54
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additional insights and contributions, useful in particular circumstances or
for solving different iterations of the same problem.63 Any waste from
duplicative efforts is therefore, under this theory, more than made up for by
gains in the pace of innovation and the added contributions by multiple
parties working on a given problem.64
B. Non-Utilitarian Accounts
1. Labor-Desert Theory
The labor-desert theory of intellectual property is the prominent nonutilitarian justification for patents. It stems from Locke’s writings on
common property.65 Locke proposed that an individual who works to
improve common property is entitled, via notions of natural law, to rights
in this property.66
In the intellectual property context, labor-desert proponents argue that
the same holds true for the “common property” of ideas.67 When someone
takes an idea and improves upon it to create an invention, natural rights
notions dictate a grant of rights in recognition of these efforts.68
Locke moderated his theory of earned property rights by two
“provisos.” First, he argued that property rights should be granted only if
there remains “enough and as good” in the commons for others to use.69
Second, he argued that “property should not be wasted.”70 A common
interpretation of Locke’s provisos in the intellectual property context holds
that granting intellectual property rights to one person should not cause a
net harm to others.71
A system that grants exclusive, albeit temporally limited, rights has the
potential to cause harm by removing ideas and inventions from the
commons.72 Labor-desert theory in the intellectual property context thus
seeks to achieve a balance between granting individual rights and

63

Id.
Id.
65
Fisher, supra note 1, at 170; Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 444–46.
66
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285–86 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
67
See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 32–33 (2011).
68
Id.
69
Fisher, supra note 1, at 170; Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 455; Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 138, 146–47 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
70
See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 297–98 (1988);
Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 455.
71
Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 78–79
(1997); see also Fisher, supra note 1, at 170; Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 455.
72
See Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 456.
64
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73

preventing harm to the larger society.
The labor-desert rationale of intellectual property is rarely cited
explicitly by the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit in patent cases. But
a number of scholars have argued that natural rights concerns nevertheless
strongly inform judicial and congressional attitudes towards intellectual
property.74
2. Personality Theory
Personality theory shares many similarities with the labor-desert
account; the two accounts are often referred to together as “moral rights”
justifications.75 Derived from the writings of Hegel, personality theory
holds that a creator is entitled to rights in his invention, not only because
justice dictates a reward for his labor, but because he has a personality
interest in his discovery.76 The theory conceives of creations as extensions
of their creators; a creator thus has an ongoing interest in the fate of his
creation just as a parent has an ongoing interest in the fate of his child.77
Monetary reward plays a less central role in personality theory than in
other theories.78 Because the theory is primarily concerned with validating
the personhood of creators through their works, its aims may be achieved
in a variety of ways that do not necessarily involve payment; for example,
by ensuring that a creator receives credit for her work or by giving her
ongoing control over how her work is used.79
Under the logic of personality theory, works that implicate a greater
personhood interest should be entitled to greater protections, and vice
versa.80 Employing this logic, Justin Hughes has argued that artistic works,
73

Id.
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 151–56 (1992) (arguing that Lockean fairness concerns
have motivated the grant of ownership rights to an expanding range of “beneficial products of human
effort”); Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 351
(2009) (arguing that natural rights notions were used to justify the creation of new areas of intellectual
property law, including trade secrets and trademarks); Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in
Intellectual Property Law? The Case Against Open Sources, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 65 (“While
sweat-of-the-brow considerations have almost disappeared from the courts’ jurisprudence, the labordesert theory as such continues to influence attitudes toward intellectual property law.”); Deborah
Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 226 (1998) (arguing that the recent expansion of property rights in intangibles
has been fueled by natural rights notions).
75
Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1753
(2012).
76
Id.; Hughes, supra note 70, at 330, 333; see also Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971–78 (1982) (arguing that the development of personality through the
embodiment of one’s will should form the basis of abstract and formal rights).
77
See Radin, supra note 76, at 965–68.
78
Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 457.
79
Id.; Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790; see also Radin, supra note 76, at 968.
80
See Hughes, supra note 70, at 339–40.
74
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including “[p]oems, stories, novels, . . . musical works[,] . . . sculpture,
paintings, and prints” are more likely candidates for legal protection than
the works of the “genetic researcher or the aerospace engineer.”81
Unlike utilitarian (and to a lesser extent, labor-desert) theories,
personality theory does not figure prominently in U.S. patent law.82
Hughes contrasts this with Europe, where in France and Germany, patent
owners are given the explicit moral right to receive attribution for their
works.83
Perhaps unsurprisingly, and in line with Hughes’s arguments, to the
extent that personality theory has proven influential in the United States, it
has been in the context of expressive works of the kind commonly
protected by copyright law.84 For example, commentators have pointed to
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which grants certain personality
rights to the creators of small distributions of visual art, including the right
to attribution.85
3. Social Planning Theory
The final theory discussed here shares with utilitarian approaches an
instrumentalist emphasis.86 Unlike utilitarian accounts of patents, however,
which focus narrowly on maximizing economic welfare by promoting
innovation, social planning theory aims more broadly to promote a “just
and attractive culture” through the intellectual property system.87
Because the goals of social planning theory are broader and less welldefined than those of utilitarian approaches, scholarship in this area has
been devoted to the threshold task of articulating what, exactly, constitutes
a “just and attractive culture.” Madhavi Sunder, who has advocated an
approach to intellectual property that would “emphasiz[e] multiple values
beyond just efficiency,” has listed as desirable values autonomy, culture,
democracy, equality, and development.88 William Fisher has argued that
the intellectual property system should promote a number of precise goals,
including creativity, community, happiness, respect, and opportunities for
meaningful work and self-determination.89
81

Id. at 340, 342–43.
But see Fromer, supra note 75, at 1792 (arguing that the attribution requirement in U.S. patent
law “ever so faintly” protects creators’ property interests).
83
Hughes, supra note 70, at 350.
84
Fisher, supra note 1, at 174.
85
Pub. L. No. 101-650, sec. 603, § 106A (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994)); Fisher, supra
note 1, at 174; Fromer, supra note 75, at 1796.
86
Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 457–58.
87
William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1747–49
(1988); see also Fisher, supra note 1, at 171 (stating that one justification for intellectual property
rights may be the creation of social and economic conditions conducive to human flourishing).
88
Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 324–25 (2006).
89
Fisher, supra note 87, at 1747–48; see also Fisher, supra note 1, at 171. Many of the values
82
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Social planning theorists have also discussed how current intellectual
property doctrines fit with their identified goals and how the system could
be tailored to better promote these goals. As with other non-utilitarian
approaches, much of this work focuses on copyright and other non-patent
intellectual property rights, like publicity.90 To the extent that courts and
legislators explicitly or implicitly rely on the social planning theory of
intellectual property, it also tends to be outside the patent context.91
III. USING A BEHAVIORAL FRAMEWORK
TO EVALUATE PATENT THEORIES
Of the various accounts that have been given to justify intellectual
property, far and away the most influential of these is the utilitarian
incentive story.92 The predominance of the incentive story may explain in
part why many recent efforts to integrate insights from psychology and
sociology into intellectual property scholarship have focused almost
exclusively on this theory.93
But a behavioral framework can play a much larger role in patent
scholarship and policy analysis. Specifically, this framework can enable us
to determine whether any of the theoretical accounts of the patent system
align with real-world behaviors. If it appears from this analysis that theory
and reality are not aligned, the behavioral literature can further contribute
by giving us insights into the types of programs and incentives that have
the best chance of achieving the goals we want our patent system to
accomplish.
In this Part, I initiate that analysis by evaluating the implications of
relevant behavioral research for each of the above-described accounts of
the patent system. But first, I begin with a brief introduction to the use of
articulated by commentators working in the social planning theory vein share similarities with, or
explicitly draw from, the capability approach to welfare economics, first articulated by Amartya Sen
and most notably elaborated upon in the development context by Martha Nussbaum. See, e.g., Sunder,
supra note 88, at 313–14.
90
Fisher, for example, has argued that the fair use copyright doctrine could be reworked such that
uses promoting his vision of an attractive culture would be deemed “fair,” while those that detracted
from this vision would not. Fisher, supra note 87, at 1766–67, 1780. Neil Netanel has argued that a
shorter copyright term would help promote creativity by placing more materials in the public domain
for others to build on. Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
3668–71 (1996). One exception to this trend is Sunder’s work, which has evaluated developments in
international patent law through the lens of distributive justice. Sunder, supra note 88, at 290–91.
91
See Fisher, supra note 1, at 175 (describing courts’ unwillingness to uphold assertions of
copyright against criticism and commentary as an example of social planning theory in action).
92
Fisher, supra note 1, at 173–74; Johnson, supra note 8, at 626–27; Lemley, supra note 10, at
129–30; see also supra Part II.A.1.
93
See infra Part III.B.1. As I also discuss in this Part, another obvious reason for this focus on the
incentive theory is the fact that a key finding from the psychology research calls into question the
premise of the incentive theory: that external incentives are required to encourage creativity.

2015]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PATENT PROTECTION

313

behavioral research generally to inform utilitarian and other modes of legal
inquiry.
A. Using Behavioral Research to Inform Legal Analyses
Beginning in the 1960s and through the 1970s, the law and economics
approach grew to become one of the dominant strains of legal analysis.94
The approach focuses on the efficiency of legal rules and incentives.95 It
assumes that an actor being governed by the legal system is rational and
will respond in ways that maximize his own personal utility.96
The premise of the rational actor, however, has long been suspect.97 In
particular, commentators have questioned whether cognitive biases could
influence behavior and cause an individual to act less than rationally even
when he has access to perfect information.98 During the initial growth of
the law and economics movement, however, there were few attempts by
either legal theorists or psychologists to elucidate legal issues with
psychological findings.99
This slowly began to change during the late 1980s and through the
1990s and 2000s as an increasing number of legal scholars started to draw
important connections between the work of experimental psychologists and
the basic assumptions made in law and economics models.100 As this “law
and behavioral science” approach gained momentum, scholars began
applying insights from the psychology literature to a range of substantive
fields of law. In 1998, a review of the literature showed that behavioral
decision-making research had been applied by commentators to questions
of contract, tort, criminal, tax, corporate, property, and family law, among
other areas.101
Today, it is an increasingly well-accepted premise that findings from
94
See Paul H. Rubin, Law and Economics, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 322–
23 (David R. Henderson ed., 2d ed. 2008).
95
Id.
96
Id.; Ellickson, supra note 2, at 23.
97
Ellickson, supra note 2, at 23.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 24.
100
See, e.g., id. at 35, 40–43 (discussing several experimental findings that call into question the
rational-actor model, including the concept of framing, wherein an actor’s weighing of risk and reward
depends on his reference frame; limitations on cognitive capacity that affect an actor’s ability to
process information; the decreased ability of an actor to process dissonant information; and limitations
on self-control that affect an actor’s ability to act rationally even when he knows this is the “right”
choice); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 9, at 1075–76, 1113–17, 1127–30, 1135–36 (discussing
additional experimental findings that call into question the rational-actor model, including the use of
heuristics or shortcuts in decision-making; the role of habits, addictions, and cravings in decisionmaking; and the finding that actors for various reasons, including compliance with social norms and
conceptions of fairness, do not always act in their own self-interest).
101
Langevoort, supra note 9, at 1502, 1511–12, 1514–15, 1517.
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the behavioral science literature can contribute important insights to a
range of substantive fields and analytic paradigms.102 For whatever reason,
however, behavioral research has been relatively slow to find its way into
analyses of intellectual property entitlements, which have been, and
continue to be, in a predominantly classical economic strain.103
This is beginning to change, however, as a growing number of
intellectual property scholars publish scholarship examining the
implications of behavioral science for intellectual property.104 Many of
these works explore the implications of the behavioral science research for
the dominant utilitarian incentive account of intellectual property.105 The
rest of this Part briefly reviews what has been done in this respect and goes
on to generalize a behavioral framework for evaluating the other major
accounts of the patent system.
B. Psychology and Utilitarian Accounts of the Patent System
In general, utilitarian justifications for patents posit that economic
incentives will encourage actors to behave in various innovationoptimizing ways. Behavioral findings can help us understand whether
individuals will respond to these incentives as predicted.
1. Incentive Theory
The incentive justification for patents holds that a patent is needed to
overcome the free-rider problem and encourage potential inventors to
engage in innovative activities they would not undertake without the
incentive. A number of intellectual property scholars have pointed to a key
finding from the psychology literature that calls the basic premise of the
incentive account into question.106
a. Motivation Research
The key finding is this: individuals, in general, undertake creative
102
This increased acceptance is exemplified by the recent growth of behavioral economics, where
findings from behavioral decision-making research are explicitly integrated into economic legal
analyses. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–8, 97–99 (2008).
103
See Fisher, supra note 1, at 169.
104
See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 75, at 1753; sources cited supra note 8.
105
See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 8, at 373 (arguing that the incentive theory of intellectual
property law should be modified in light of social norms); Johnson, supra note 8, at 678–79
(concluding that patent entitlements should be sunsetted in light of behavioral research that calls the
incentive theory into question); Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 1999–2000
(arguing that psychological research offers insight into the incentive theory of intellectual property);
Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 816–17 (arguing that a “socio-historical approach” can contribute
important insights to the “primary goal of patent law . . . to incentivize innovation”).
106
See Johnson, supra note 8, at 640–41; Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8,
at 2007–12; Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 47–49.
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activities not for a monetary reward, but because they are intrinsically
motivated to do so—because they wish to “engag[e] in [the] activity for its
own sake, out of interest, or for the pleasure and satisfaction derived from
the experience.”107 In contrast, extrinsic motivators like money, which
align more closely with the utilitarian rational-actor model of decisionmaking,108 actually may detract from creative behavior.109 Since a patent
may function as an extrinsic motivator, commentators have noted that this
finding has implications for the incentive theory of patents.110
The commentators differ somewhat in their determinations of what
these implications are. Eric Johnson argues that the current system of
patent entitlements could be “phased out entirely.”111 He points to
restrictions on competition and other losses that accrue from the patent
system.112 Since it appears from the motivation research that patents may
not be required to incentivize creativity, Johnson proposes that patent
rights be granted only in limited situations and only on a showing that they
are needed to incentivize creation or for some other reason.113
On the other hand, Gregory Mandel asserts that our current patent
system is not necessarily inconsistent with the motivation research.114 The
research suggests, for example, that framing a given activity as achieving
either intrinsic or extrinsic goals can influence the motivation of the
individual engaging in the activity.115 If the activity is framed as achieving
intrinsic goals, intrinsic motivation and attendant creativity are enhanced,
107
Hsiu-Fen Lin, Effects of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation on Employee Knowledge Sharing
Intentions, 33 J. INFO. SCI. 135, 137 (2007).
108
Id.
109
TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 92–93 (1996); see also Mandel, To Promote
the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2007–08. But see Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental
Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1938–39 (2014)
(discussing behavioral findings suggesting that extrinsic motivators may not undermine creativity in all
contexts; for example, when individuals are given instructions about how to perform creatively to
achieve a reward, or when the reward is performance-contingent rather than completion-contingent).
110
E.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 624–26; Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note
8, at 2010–11. Cohen and Zimmerman have made the same observation in the context of the copyright
system. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research
Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143; Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 47–48.
111
Johnson, supra note 8, at 675–76.
112
Id. at 671, 677.
113
Id. at 675–76. In the copyright context, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman suggests a number of
implications for the copyright system arising from the intrinsic motivation research. See Zimmerman,
supra note 18, at 30. Although she does not suggest that copyright entitlements should be eliminated
altogether, she does argue for an end to copyright term extensions, the creation of additional statutory
exemptions to copyright, and a more liberal construal by courts of noninfringing uses. Id. at 54–57.
114
See Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2012 (arguing that patent law’s
nonobviousness requirement may enhance intrinsic motivation and promote creative achievement).
115
Maarten Vansteenkiste et al., Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Goal Contents in Self-Determination
Theory: Another Look at the Quality of Academic Motivation, 41 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 19, 24–25
(2006).
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116

and vice versa. According to Mandel, to the extent the nonobviousness
requirement for patents frames the inventive process as achieving the
intrinsic goal of creativity, this doctrine may enhance rather than detract
from creative behavior.117
Further, recent empirical work by Christopher Buccafusco and
colleagues suggests that when extrinsic incentives are probabilistic and
threshold-based—as patent rights are—rather than directly based on
performance—as are many of the incentives examined in the social science
literature—these incentives may not undermine, and may in fact
encourage, creativity.118 Based on this finding, and similarly to Mandel, the
authors of this empirical study suggest that the high nonobvious threshold
for patent protection might be beneficial for motivation and creativity.119
Despite the disagreement over the best response to findings from the
motivation research, it is clear that these findings present a more
complicated picture than the economic incentive theory acknowledges.
Further attention to this issue is thus justified. Incentive theory could be
refined in order to fully account for the behavioral research.120
Alternatively, the theory might lose its position as the dominant account of
the patent system as commentators turn to other justifications for patent
entitlements that are more in keeping with behavioral research.121
b. Other Findings
Intellectual property scholars working in a behavioral science vein
have pointed to a number of other insights from the empirical literature and
analyzed these within the framework of incentive theory. These insights
include the discovery that collaborative, cross-disciplinary work can
enhance creativity;122 the finding that creative output generally requires
both problem-finding and problem-solving skills and a mix of convergent

116

Id.
Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2012.
118
Buccafusco et al., supra note 109, at 1977.
119
Id. at 1978.
120
An example of such a refinement is Mandel’s suggestion that the nonobviousness requirement
be maintained or strengthened to assure that the patent “frames” invention as an intrinsic goal for
inventors. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2012; Gregory Mandel, The NonObvious Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent
Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 90 (2008).
121
As stated in Part I, one of the goals of this Article is to initiate an inquiry into the consistency
of the various patent justifications with behavioral research. One of the main concerns of scholars who
have pointed to the connection between the motivation research and the incentive theory of intellectual
property is that the continued dominance of incentive theory may perpetuate rent-seeking behavior by
actors who do not require a patent as an incentive, but who nevertheless want to reap the rewards a
patent offers. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 665; Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 55.
122
Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2013–16; see also Pedraza-Fariña,
supra note 8, at 838–40.
117
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123

(analytic) and divergent (intuitive) thinking; the understanding that the
creative process progresses in stages;124 and the idea that vested interests or
prevailing social norms can either hinder or encourage innovation.125
As these scholars have pointed out, these additional findings have
implications for and within the incentive account of the patent system.126
But unlike the discovery that individuals may not need external incentives
to achieve optimal levels of creativity, these insights do not necessarily
speak to the fundamental correctness or viability of incentive theory.127 To
the extent that these findings have more fundamental implications for
alternate accounts of the patent system, I will discuss them below.
2. Disclosure Theory
Disclosure theory, a second utilitarian justification for patents that has
seen some popularity with courts, holds that a patent incentive is necessary
to prevent an inventor from keeping her invention secret.128 But behavioral
research suggests that this theory may not be grounded in the reality of
human behavior.
a. Motivation Research
i. Disclosure and Reward
Just as incentive theory has been called into question by the suggestion
that individuals may not need external motivators to encourage creative
activity, it is also possible that individuals need no external motivators to
encourage them to share their creative fruits with others. Indeed, following
the logic of the creativity motivation research, which has shown that
individuals are intrinsically motivated to create in part out of a desire to
contribute and “give back” to society,129 one might expect this to be the
case.130
This intuition is borne out by empirical studies. Researchers have
123
Fromer, supra note 8, at 1468–72; Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at
2002, 2004–05, 2007.
124
Fromer, supra note 8, at 1462.
125
Id. at 1474; Hubbard, supra note 8, at 376–78; Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 844–45.
126
See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 8, at 1443–44 (“If the goal of patent and copyright law is to
provide an incentive to produce creative works, it is worth looking to the psychological literature that
illuminates the process by which scientists and artists actually create and by which individuals
appreciate creative works.”).
127
In contrast, and as explained in Part III.B.1, supra, the motivation research potentially presents
a fatal challenge to incentive theory.
128
See supra Part II.A.2.
129
See Zimmerman, supra note 18, at 44.
130
The idea that individuals may be willing to share their creative outputs for something other
than a monetary reward has also been suggested by others. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790,
1797 (arguing that attribution can serve as a more powerful incentive than money in many cases);
Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 465 (same).
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found that intrinsic motivation plays a significant role in a person’s desire
to share knowledge and discoveries with others.131 In particular, intrinsic
factors like knowledge self-efficacy (a person’s sense that he has valuable
information to share) and enjoyment in helping others predict a person’s
willingness to share knowledge.132 In contrast, external rewards seem to
have little effect on a person’s willingness to share knowledge.133
The behavioral research, then, suggests that disclosure theory’s
premise—that an external reward is required to encourage inventors to
disclose information that they would otherwise keep secret—may not be
correct.
A potential caveat of this conclusion is one that has also been
identified for motivation research’s challenge to incentive theory: although
individuals may indeed be internally motivated to create (or, in this case,
disclose their creations), the majority of patentable innovation (and
subsequent disclosure) is accomplished by individuals who are working
not independently, but within organizations.134 Unlike individuals,
organizations may be more likely to behave like rational actors,
undertaking cost-benefit analyses and subject to utilitarian incentives.135 So
where an individual might disclose an invention for purely intrinsic
reasons, a firm might keep the same invention secret absent an extrinsic
award that tips the cost-benefit scale in favor of disclosure.136
131

See, e.g., Lin, supra note 107, at 135, 137.
E.g., Lin, supra note 107, at 137; Wole Olatokun & Chinazom Irene Nwafor, The Effect of
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation on Knowledge Sharing Intentions of Civil Servants in Ebonyi State,
Nigeria, 28 INFO. DEV. 216 (2012); Gee-Woo Bock & Young-Gul Kim, Breaking the Myths of
Rewards: An Exploratory Study of Attitudes About Knowledge Sharing (PACIS 2001 Proceedings,
Paper No. 78, 2001).
133
Bock & Kim, supra note 132; Lin, supra note 107, at 143, 145; Olatokun & Nwafor, supra
note 132. One exception to this conclusion, as I will discuss later in this Article, is the finding that the
extrinsic reward of enhanced personal reputation can motivate knowledge sharing. See, e.g., Molly
McLure Wasko & Samer Faraj, Why Should I Share? Examining Social Capital and Knowledge
Contribution in Electronic Networks of Practice, 29 MIS Q. 35, 53 (2005).
134
According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, only approximately fourteen percent of all
patented inventions originate from independent inventors. Compare Patent Counts by Class by Year—
Independent Inventors, January 1977–December 2014, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby_in.htm [http://perma.cc/E6VJ-GU4K] (last
visited Nov. 21, 2015) (listing 1,225,614 utility patents that were unassigned or assigned to an
individual rather than an organization), with Patent Counts by Class by Year, January 1977–December
2014, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm
[http://perma.cc/WZ74-FEQE] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (listing a total of 9,020,440 utility patents in
the same time period).
135
See Johnson, supra note 8, at 661 (stating that corporations, generally speaking, may proceed
in a more calculated, practical manner than most individuals with respect to the production of
intellectual property).
136
The difference between individuals and organizations in their willingness to disclose
information is hinted at by the fact that many firms require their employees to sign non-disclosure
agreements. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Intellectual Property and Restrictive Covenants, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
132
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A response to this caveat is the same as that provided for incentive
theory’s parallel concern.137 Empirical studies suggest that many firms, in
their innovative decision-making, simply do not take the prospect of a
patent reward into account.138 In fact, a surprising number of firms view
patents as an ineffective way to make profits and recoup research and
development costs.139 If an organization is not motivated by a patent to
innovate in the first place because it does not consider the patent an
effective way to achieve a return on investment, it is unlikely that the same
firm will be motivated by the patent to disclose information that it
otherwise sees fit to keep to itself.140
This response is by no means complete. For one thing, the studies cited
do not suggest that firms, like people, are intrinsically motivated to
disclose their inventions; instead, they indicate only that a patent might not
be the most effective way to encourage this disclosure. Further attention to
how intrinsic motivation and other sociological and psychological factors
influencing disclosure behavior play out in the various settings where
patentable innovation actually takes place is thus warranted. But at the very
least, the fact that a patent reward likely will do little to encourage
disclosure at the individual level suggests that disclosure theory may not
align with real-world behavior.
ii. Disclosure and Attribution
Behavioral research suggests that the classic extrinsic motivator—
money—does not influence an individual’s willingness to share
knowledge.141 Interestingly, though, this same work suggests that a
different kind of reward, though still technically extrinsic in the sense that
it is externally administered, does have the power to motivate disclosure
behavior. This reward is attribution, with its concomitant benefits of
reputation enhancement and feedback.

OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 517, 525–26 (Kenneth

G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds.,

2009).
137

See Johnson, supra note 8, at 661.
Id. at 661–63 (citing MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 62 (2008)).
139
Id. One major exception to this is the pharmaceutical industry, where industry players report
that patents play a major role in innovative behavior. A report cited by Johnson concludes that sixtyfive percent of pharmaceutical innovations would not have made it to market without a patent
incentive. Id. at 663 (citing Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT.
SCI. 173, 175 (1986)).
140
For example, Boldrin and Levine’s report indicates that for new processes in particular,
innovators prefer secrecy to a patent monopoly. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 138, at 62.
141
Lin, supra note 107, at 143, 145; Olatokun & Nwafor, supra note 132; Bock & Kim, supra
note 132.
138
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142

In the context of online communities,
for example, individuals
choose to share their knowledge with others instead of free riding in part
because they believe it will enhance their personal and professional
reputations.143 Similarly, in a controlled knowledge-sharing laboratory
experiment, a reputation feedback reward was the most significant
predictor of an individual’s willingness to disclose.144 This was in contrast
to other extrinsic motivators, including economic rewards and reciprocity,
which the study concluded had little effect on a participant’s willingness to
share knowledge.145
These findings are notable because the classic understanding in the
motivation community is that intrinsic motivators of a given action tend to
promote that action and enhance its outcome, while extrinsic motivators
tend to be outcome-neutral or outcome-detrimental.146 The findings are
potentially consistent, however, with Edward Deci and Richard Ryan’s
explanation that “there are varied types of extrinsic motivation, some of
which do, indeed, represent impoverished forms of motivation and some of
which represent active, agentic states.”147 In particular, extrinsically
motivated behaviors that increase an individual’s feelings of competence
and autonomy can, like intrinsically motivated behaviors, result in
enhanced performance outcomes.148 Positive performance feedback has
also been shown directly to enhance intrinsic motivation.149 Attribution,
therefore, though an extrinsic reward, is perhaps a powerful motivator of
knowledge sharing because of the promise of enhanced feelings of
competency (through enhanced reputation and positive feedback) that it
offers.
Consistent with these findings, several commentators have argued that
attribution is a key component of a successful intellectual property system
that, in at least some cases, might be more important than economic
reward. Michael Burstein and others suggest that attribution encourages
142
Online communities are referred to as “electronic networks of practice” by the authors. Wasko
& Faraj, supra note 133, at 35.
143
Id. at 49–50.
144
Shin-Yuan Hung et al., The Influence of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation on Individuals’
Knowledge Sharing Behavior, 69 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 415, 422–23 (2011).
145
Id. at 422–24. Consistent with the research described earlier in this Article, Hung et al. found
that the intrinsic motivator of altruism was positively related to willingness to disclose, though the
relationship was not as strong as that between willingness to disclose and reputation feedback. Id. at
424–25.
146
See, e.g., Richard M. Ryan & Jennifer G. LaGuardia, Achievement Motivation Within a
Pleasured Society: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations to Learn and the Politics of School Reform, in
11 ADVANCES IN MOTIVATION AND ACHIEVEMENT 45, 50, 54, 55 (Timothy C. Urdan ed., 1999).
147
Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions
and New Directions, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 54, 55 (2000).
148
Id. at 58 (citing R. CHRISTOPHER DECHARMS, PERSONAL CAUSATION (1968)).
149
Id. at 59 (citing Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic
Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 114 (1971)).
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150

disclosure in the academic context.
Jeanne Fromer argues that in
addition to the financial advantages that flow from attribution through
reputational effects, attribution can also act as an “expressive incentive”
that encourages creation.151 And based on an analysis of the factors that
influence the success of intellectual property’s negative spaces, Elizabeth
Rosenblatt proposes attribution as an alternative to exclusivity.152 The
analysis of the psychology literature presented here provides additional
support for these proposals.
b. Disclosure Social Norms
Actors the patent system seeks to govern are influenced not only by
individual psychological factors, but also by social norms.153 Just as
psychological motivations might make the patent, and the incentive to
disclose it provides, unnecessary in certain instances, social norms in
certain contexts might encourage information sharing even in the absence
of a patent.154
One context where this appears to be true is the university research
setting. Intellectual property scholars have noted the prevalence of
knowledge-sharing norms in the academic science community.155 Robert
Merton, for example, describes the norm of “scientific communism” in
academia, where scientific researchers share a “common heritage” of
collaboration that arises from both the community’s goal of advancing
knowledge and individual researchers’ desires for recognition and
esteem.156
Although disclosure theory suggests that patent rights might enhance
these knowledge-sharing norms by providing increased incentives for
disclosure, Eisenberg and others have voiced concern that the opposite in
fact might be true.157 In particular, the prospect of a patent might delay
knowledge sharing by academics who are concerned about meeting the
150

Burstein, supra note 51, at 269–70.
Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790–91. The distinction Fromer draws between the “pecuniary” and
“expressive” incentives offered by an attribution right are very similar to the “extrinsic” and “intrinsic”
motivational components of attribution revealed in the psychology literature.
152
Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 478–79.
153
Hubbard, supra note 8, at 373; Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 815–16.
154
Although this might not always be the case, social norms in many situations might result
directly or indirectly from psychological factors. See, e.g., infra note 156.
155
E.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017,
1046–48 (1989); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79–80 (1999); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, BayhDole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289 (2003).
156
Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 1046–47 (quoting ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SCIENCE 273 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973)). Note that according to Merton and Eisenberg’s accounts,
the norm of scientific communism appears to arise at least in part from scientists’ desires for reputation
enhancement. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this suggests that psychological factors may drive social norms.
157
E.g., Rai, supra note 155, at 109–15; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 291.
151
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requirements imposed by the patent system; additionally, confidentiality
requirements imposed by firms in academic-industry collaborations might
impede disclosure.159
Empirical studies confirm that patents have indeed undermined the
knowledge sharing that flows from social norms in the academic
community.160 In a study examining data-sharing behavior among
university scientists, Jeremy Grushcow found that patent-seekers were less
likely than non-patent-seekers to share early research results.161 Patentseekers also delayed formal publication as compared to non-patentseekers.162 In one study, academic scientists involved in an academicindustry collaboration were more likely than their non-collaborating
colleagues to delay publication and less likely to share their results with
other scientists.163 Over a period of ten years, non-patent-seeking academic
scientists also increasingly delayed their pre-publication disclosures,
suggesting that the introduction of patents to the academic community in
1980 via the Bayh-Dole Act shifted sharing norms in that group.164
This case study of the academic community suggests that, rather than
providing the incentive to share that disclosure theory posits, a patent
actually might undermine disclosure behaviors largely governed by social
norms.
3. Prospect Theory
Prospect theory seeks to promote the efficient management of
innovation by granting broad and early patent rights to a single actor, who
may then—presumably with optimal efficiency—direct and coordinate
future research and development efforts within the field of the original
invention.165 Findings from the behavioral literature call these assumptions
about the benefits of single-entity domination into question.166

158
For example, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) bars an invention from being patented if it has been
“described in a printed publication” or “in public use” for over a year before filing. The Federal Circuit
held that a poster presentation, of the kind routinely given at academic conferences to report
preliminary research results, counted as a “printed publication” that barred patentability under § 102(b).
In re Klopfenstein and Brent, 380 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
159
Rai, supra note 155, at 110–12.
160
See, e.g., Jeremy M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33
J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 60 (2004) (measuring the secrecy of inventors who are preparing to file a patent
application).
161
Id. at 74.
162
Id.
163
David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Sciences: Evidence
from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224, 1224 (1997).
164
Id. at 78; see also Rai, supra note 155, at 109–15.
165
See supra Part II.A.3.
166
Prospect theory has also been heavily criticized on economic grounds. See, e.g., Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048–50
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a. Satisficing
The concept of satisficing was first introduced by the economist and
psychologist Herbert Simon in the 1950s.167 He postulated that cognitive
limitations might prevent otherwise rational actors from finding the
optimal solution to a problem.168 As a result, these individuals might accept
a satisfactory, but sub-optimal, alternative solution.169 This decisionmaking strategy has since been observed in empirical studies.170
Merges and Nelson have argued that satisficing behaviors might be
relevant to the prospect theory of patents.171 Under prospect theory, the
theoretically optimal solution for a firm with a patent is to maximize its
value by making improvements that take full advantage of the broad scope
of exclusivity.172 But a firm with a lucrative original invention might
choose to settle for the financial benefits that flow from this invention
rather than taking the risks inherent in further research and development.173
This satisficing solution is made even more desirable by the original
inventor’s broad patent rights, which guarantee that no other firm—without
either arranging for a license or risking infringement—will step in to fill
the innovative space the patentee has chosen to leave empty.174
b. Creativity Collaboration Research
Even assuming that an original inventor will undertake further
innovation and research within the broad scope of the patent contemplated
(1997) [hereinafter Lemley, The Economics of Improvement] (describing the problems arising from
making inventors outline every possible future use of their inventions); Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (arguing that intellectual
property law should give the smallest amount of protection possible while still encouraging
innovation); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871–73 (1990) (describing the problems with single-entity domination of a
patent).
167
See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49
AM. ECON. REV. 253, 262–65 (1959) (discussing the differences between satisficing and maximizing in
a firm’s decision-making).
168
Id. at 262–63.
169
Id.
170
See Itamar Simonson & Aner Sela, On the Heritability of Consumer Decision Making: An
Exploratory Approach for Studying Genetic Effects on Judgment and Choice, 37 J. CONSUMER RES.
951, 956 (2011) (analyzing different factors that influence a consumer’s choices and judgments,
including satisficing and maximizing decision-making approaches); Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing
Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178, 1178
(2002) (analyzing the happiness of maximizers and satisficers).
171
Merges & Nelson, supra note 166, at 872.
172
Lemley, supra note 22, at 738.
173
Merges & Nelson, supra note 166, at 916.
174
See id. at 842. This concern is supported by anecdotal reports. See id. at 872 n.141 (describing
Thomas Edison’s refusal to improve his light bulb technology and his opposition to the innovation of
alternating current); Lemley, supra note 22, at 740–41 (describing Edison’s story and also pointing to
Watt’s decision not to improve on his steam engine).
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by prospect theory, additional behavioral insights suggest that he may not
be in the best position to do so.
In particular, creativity research, as noted by intellectual property
scholars in other contexts, suggests that collaboration can facilitate
creativity.175 The benefits of collaboration for innovation arise because
creative thinking often requires potential innovators to draw associations
and make connections among disparate sources and fields.176
Collaboration, and in particular, cross-disciplinary collaboration, facilitates
this type of thinking because each member of a collaborative team brings a
unique background, perspective, and specialization to the innovative
process.177
This finding undermines prospect theory’s premise that a single
inventor or firm is in the best position to direct further innovation in the
field of the patent. Even when satisficing behaviors are not present, a
patentee seeking to improve on her original invention likely will be unable
to achieve the same level of creative achievement alone as she would with
input from other sources.
Of course, even if the original inventor is not granted the broad patent
rights that prospect theory envisions, there is no guarantee that she will
collaborate with other individuals or firms when working to improve her
original invention. But it is not collaboration per se that generates benefits
for the creative process, but the exposure to diverse ideas that collaboration
facilitates.178 And this exposure likely will still come about even if the
original inventor is not collaborating formally with others. In the absence
of a broad patent monopoly, we might expect that within a short period of
time other firms will begin introducing products that build on the original
inventor’s idea.179 The commercial availability of these products will
175
Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2013–16; Pedraza-Fariña, supra
note 8, at 840–43; see also Paul B. Paulus & Bernard A. Nijstad, Group Creativity: An Introduction, in
GROUP CREATIVITY: INNOVATION THROUGH COLLABORATION (Paul B. Paulus & Bernard A. Nijstad
eds., 2003).
176
See Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2014 (discussing several
relevant findings from the psychology and sociology literature, including the finding that individuals
exposed to unrelated images produce more creative output than those not so exposed; that reliance on a
more diverse set of sources is related to creativity in scientists; and that significant innovation often
integrates principles from different fields).
177
See id.; Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 840–43. Collaborative problem-solving is not without
potential drawbacks, however. In particular, there is a danger that group problem-solvers will engage in
“group-think,” a phenomenon in which individuals within a group display limited or defective thinking
as a result of efforts to avoid conflicts within the group. Garold Stasser & Zachary Birchmeier, Group
Creativity and Collective Choice, in GROUP CREATIVITY, supra note 175, at 105.
178
See Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process, supra note 8, at 2014.
179
See Lemley, supra note 22, at 740 (referring to first-mover and brand reputation benefits that
encourage firms to enter an innovative space in the absence of patent protection). As discussed in Part
III.B.1., supra, others might also be intrinsically motivated to create, in this case, by building on the
original patentee’s ideas.
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expose the original inventor—and others—to a range of ideas and uses that
the inventor may not have originally contemplated.180 This exposure, in
turn, should inspire further creativity on the part of the original inventor
and others.
c. Parkinson’s Law
Parkinson’s law is really a maxim, first proposed by the historian Cyril
Northcote Parkinson in the 1950s. Parkinson opined that “work expands so
as to fill the time available for its completion.”181
Since that time, Parkinson’s law has been tested in a variety of
experimental settings. It has been found accurately to describe, not, as
framed by Parkinson, the physical characteristics of work, but the behavior
of individuals engaged in this work.182 Though the work itself does not
expand, people generally adjust their behavior so as to fill the time allotted
to complete a project.
Edwin Locke, a pioneer in the field of goal-setting, has shown that
Parkinson’s law is mediated by individuals’ goal-setting behavior.183 When
time limits are decreased, individuals set more difficult goals for
themselves, and the more difficult goals in turn reduce time-to-completion
and enhance performance.184 In the creative arena, empirical research
confirms that goal-setting also leads to higher levels of creativity.185
Parkinson’s law has potential implications for the pace of innovation
under prospect theory. If an original inventor is granted a broad patent that
encompasses both the original invention and future improvements, the
inventor has a predetermined amount of time—the duration of the patent,
presently twenty years from filing186—to enjoy that monopoly. The
inventor thus knows in advance that he has this period, which in some

180
See Lemley, supra note 22, at 743 (arguing that an original inventor might be “psychologically
tied” to a particular use of his idea and may not grasp the uses or improvements that outsiders might
see).
181
CYRIL NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, PARKINSON’S LAW AND OTHER STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION
2 (1957).
182
E.g., Gary P. Latham & Edwin A. Locke, Increasing Productivity with Decreasing Time
Limits: A Field Replication of Parkinson’s Law, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 524, 524 (1975); Edwin A.
Locke & Gary P. Latham, Building a Practically Useful Theory of Goal Setting and Task Motivation: A
35-Year Odyssey, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 705, 705 (2002); Lawrence H. Peters et al., The Relationship
Between Time Pressure and Performance: A Field Test of Parkinson’s Law, 5 J. OCCUPATIONAL
BEHAV. 293, 293–94 (1984).
183
E.g., Edwin A. Locke & Judith Bryan, The Directing Function of Goals in Task Performance,
4 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 35 (1969).
184
Id.
185
E.g., Christina E. Shalley, Effects of Coaction, Expected Evaluation, and Goal Setting on
Creativity and Productivity, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 483, 499 (1995).
186
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
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fields is quite long compared to the average pace of innovation,187 to
maximize patent value. According to Parkinson’s law, the inventor thus
might set less difficult creative goals for himself, resulting in a relatively
slow pace of innovation and less creative output. In contrast, if the inventor
enjoys no such monopoly, he is aware that a competitor might release
potentially lucrative downstream innovation at any time. He thus might set
more difficult goals for himself, resulting in more creative, faster-paced
innovation.
It is true that even under the broad grant of rights prospect theory
envisions, a patentee will still have an economic incentive to develop
follow-on innovation sooner rather than later. If a patentee develops a
commercially successful improvement covered by his patent in the first
year of an eighteen-year patent term, for example, he can enjoy monopoly
profits on that improvement for the remaining seventeen years of the
patent. If, on the other hand, he waits until fifteen years of the patent term
have passed before introducing the improvement, the total monopoly profit
he can hope to gain from this improvement clearly will be much lower.
This financial incentive might still not be as effective as the freemarket scenario, however, due to satisficing. Satisficing might affect not
only, as discussed above, whether follow-on innovation occurs at all, but
also the pace of this innovation. For instance, an original inventor with a
broad patent might rest on the laurels of his original invention for part of
the patent term before eventually deciding to develop follow-on
innovation. Just as a tendency towards satisficing might overcome the
economic incentive to maximize the patent space,188 so too might it
overcome the incentive to engage in maximization sooner rather than later.
4. Commercialization
Commercialization theory justifies the patent system as a means of
encouraging, not (as incentive theory posits) the original creative step, nor
(as envisioned by prospect theory) follow-on creative steps, but postinventive commercialization activities.189 Unlike these other utilitarian
accounts of the patent system, the empirical psychology literature does not
call the basic assumptions of the commercialization account into question.
Instead, the literature generally supports the main premise of
commercialization theory—that economic incentives might encourage
inventors to bring their ideas to market.
187
The software field in particular has been noted as having a particularly fast rate of innovation.
See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61
UCLA L. REV. 672, 679–81, 719 (2014) (noting that the average time-to-market for innovations in the
information-technology industries is relatively short compared to other industries).
188
See supra text accompanying notes 171–74.
189
See supra Part II.A.4.
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a. Motivation Research
i. Motivation to Engage in Different Types of Tasks
As discussed in my treatment of incentive theory above, individuals
are intrinsically motivated to engage in creative behaviors.190 Richard Ryan
and Edward Deci have described intrinsic motivation as “the inherent
tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one’s
capacities, to explore, and to learn.”191
Given this description, one might expect certain types of activities to
be more susceptible to intrinsic motivation than others. In particular,
individuals might experience relatively lower intrinsic motivation for
activities that do not involve novelty, challenge, or the opportunity to
exercise one’s skills, explore, or learn, as compared to those that do.
This intuition is borne out by the psychology literature. In a review of
the intrinsic motivation literature, Ryan and Deci explain:
[P]eople will be intrinsically motivated only for activities that
hold intrinsic interest for them, activities that have the appeal
of novelty, challenge, or aesthetic value. For activities that do
not hold such appeal, the principles of [our theoretical
framework for intrinsic motivation] do not apply, because the
activities will not be experienced as intrinsically motivated to
begin with.192
The finding that only certain types of activities inspire intrinsic
motivation193 has implications for various accounts of the patent system. In
the context of incentive theory, the finding that individuals are intrinsically
motivated to create—and the subsequent conclusion by some
commentators that a patent might not be necessary to encourage
individuals to do so—squares well with an intuitive understanding of what
creation is. Almost by definition, creativity involves the “novelty and
challenge[], . . . explor[ation], . . . [and] learn[ing]” that Ryan and Deci
speak of.194 Indeed, dictionary definitions of creativity describe it as the
ability to “make new things or think of new ideas,”195 “transcend
190

AMABILE, supra note 109, at 107.
Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of
Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 68, 70 (2000).
192
Id. at 71.
193
Even for categories of activities that one might expect to be intrinsically motivated, the context
in which these activities are carried out has important implications for the degree of motivation felt. For
example, empirical studies have shown that feelings of autonomy, competence, and relatedness each
play an important role in determining the ultimate level of intrinsic motivation for a particular task. For
a review of the literature, see id. at 70–71.
194
Id. at 70.
195
Definition of “Creative”, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
creative [http://perma.cc/69XF-2D9S] (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
191

328

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:297

traditional ideas, rules, patterns, relationships, or the like, and to create
meaningful new ideas, forms, methods, [and] interpretations.”196
In contrast, we may not think of the tasks that must be accomplished to
bring a creation to market—tasks that occur after the initial inventive steps
have been taken—as embodying the same qualities that inspire intrinsic
motivation.
Take, for example, the case of the pharmaceutical industry—a field for
which it is almost universally accepted that some type of economic
incentive is required to encourage optimal levels of innovation.197 Because
of the intensive regulatory requirements placed on pharmaceutical
products,198 there are many relatively routine and structured steps that need
to be taken after the initial creative research has been completed, but before
a potential product can be brought to market.199 These include initial
laboratory and preclinical testing, several phases of clinical trials, and
formulation and bioavailability studies, among other things.200 Although
these tasks might require some creative thinking on the part of the
employees who undertake them, it can be argued that these steps present
fewer opportunities for “novelty and challenge[], . . . explor[ation], . . .
[and] learn[ing]”201 than the drug discovery process that precedes them.202
196
Definition of “Creativity”, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
creativity [http://perma.cc/KUX3-E72M] (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
197
See, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 138, at 62–63 (noting that while patents are typically
regarded as the least effective means of economic incentive, the pharmaceutical industry provides an
example of why patents are essential); Johnson, supra note 8, at 663 (“[M]ultiple empirical studies
confirm that patents are highly effective for appropriating gains only in certain industries. One of those
is pharmaceuticals.”); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEX. L. REV. 503, 507–08 (2009) (explaining that because pharmaceutical firms must invest large
amounts of money into clinic trials before drugs can be sold to the public, strong patent protection is
necessary as an incentive for product development); Roin, supra note 187, at 680–81 (noting that firms
in the pharmaceutical industry did not support policy proposals that would weaken patent protection
because strong patent protection is thought to be critical in protecting their research and development
investments).
198
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009) (discussing the FDA’s premarket approval
requirements for new drugs); PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 643 (4th ed. 2014) (“In short, the FDA licensure process is extremely lengthy and
expensive.”).
199
See generally HUTT ET AL., supra note 198, at 669–751 (discussing development and licensure
of new drugs).
200
Id.
201
Ryan & Deci, supra note 191, at 70.
202
Compare ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, SCIENCE AND INNOVATION: THE US PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY DURING THE 1980s, at 163 (1995) (finding that small pharmaceutical firms are more creative
than large firms), and Rebecca Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural Innovation: The
Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms, 35 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 9, 28–29 (1990) (finding that less-established architectural firms may be more willing to
innovate than well-entrenched, dominant firms), with SARAH RICKWOOD, GLOBAL
PHARMACEUTICALS: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 70–71 (1993) (finding that small pharmaceutical firms
spend a higher proportion of their potential profits on research versus commercialization than large
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The same can be said for other types of inventions as well. Tasks like
market research, product management, and quality assurance, though
perhaps more routine and thus not as intrinsically motivating as the earlier
phases of the inventive process, are nevertheless necessary steps for
bringing most inventions to market successfully.203 If individuals are not
intrinsically motivated to undertake these activities, then it is possible that
some type of external motivation, like a patent, is necessary to encourage
this behavior.
Empirical studies confirm that individuals may respond to external
motivations like financial rewards when engaged in tasks that are not
intrinsically motivating. For example, Calder and Staw first demonstrated
that monetary rewards could increase motivation for boring tasks.204 A
further study concluded that individuals may be more willing to engage in
a highly structured task (as opposed to a low-structure task where there is
more room for independence and creativity) when they receive a financial
reward for doing so.205 And a study of recently employed professional
graduates concluded that while individuals who choose a job based on
salary considerations do not exhibit significantly increased intrinsic
motivation compared to those who do not choose the job for financial
reasons, they do exhibit increased behavioral and attitudinal commitment
to the job.206
ii. A Motivational Account of Commercialization Theory
In developing a motivational account of commercialization theory, the
case of the pharmaceutical industry is instructive. Besides being an area
where extensive non-intrinsically motivating work is needed to bring an
invention to market, it is also a field where the patent system of financial
incentives actually seems to work pretty well.207 In contrast, the software
firms).
203

See Sichelman, supra note 45, at 348–54.
Bobby J. Calder & Barry M. Staw, Self-Perception of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 31 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 599, 602 (1975). Consistent with earlier studies and the research
reported in this Article, Calder and Staw found that monetary rewards decreased motivation for
interesting tasks. Id. But see Thomas L. Daniel & James K. Esser, Intrinsic Motivation as Influenced by
Rewards, Task Interest, and Task Structure, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 566, 571 (1980) (finding that
monetary rewards did not increase intrinsic motivation for low-interest tasks, but did increase
individuals’ willingness to repeat these tasks).
205
Daniel & Esser, supra note 204, at 571.
206
Charles A. O’Reilly III & David F. Caldwell, Job Choice: The Impact of Intrinsic and
Extrinsic Factors on Subsequent Satisfaction and Commitment, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 559, 561–63
(1980).
207
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 663 (citing BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 138, at 62)
(discussing empirical findings suggesting that patents provide incentives only in certain industries, one
of which is the pharmaceutical industry); Roin, supra note 197, at 507–08, 510–11 (describing
pharmaceutical innovation as the “golden child of the patent system,” and discussing the essential role
that patents play in promoting drug development); Roin, supra note 187, at 680 (noting that
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industry requires a relatively slight amount of post-invention
commercialization activity, and it is well-known that patents do little to
encourage innovation in this field.208
Proponents of commercialization theory have noted the relationship
between the extent of post-innovative activity generally required to bring a
product to market and the need for financial incentives. Based on this
correlation, Benjamin Roin has proposed that the length of patent
protection be keyed to the time required to bring a product to market as
measured from the time of first patent filing.209
Roin and others explain the correlation between time-to-market and the
need for financial incentives in terms of economic factors such as higher
research, development, and production costs, greater economic risk, and
greater susceptibility to free-riding.210 But the relationship could also be
explained in part by the motivation research. According to motivation
theory, while financial incentives do not help—and could hurt—progress
in fields where the bulk of the work is of the kind typically considered to
be intrinsically motivated, these incentives can be useful when bringing a
product to market requires a substantial amount of routine and structured
work. This is precisely what we see in the software and pharmaceutical
industries.
As with every application of motivation research to the theories
discussed in this Article, there is a major caveat to the argument that
motivation research supports the premise of commercialization theory.
This is the fact that most patentable innovation originates not from
individuals but from firms, which may respond to various incentives
differently from individuals.
Of course, firms are made up of individuals. So at the very least, we
might expect employees’ intrinsic motivation to lower costs for firms, and
conversely, employees’ lack of intrinsic motivation to raise costs for firms
as more financial incentives are required to entice employees to undertake
non-creative work.211
pharmaceutical firms perceive patents to be critical in protecting their research and development
investments).
208
See, e.g., Roin, supra note 187, at 679–81; Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents:
Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 193 (2008).
209
See Roin, supra note 187.
210
Id. at 684–85; see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 672–74 (explaining the pharmaceutical
industry’s deviance from the “general rule of spontaneous creative labor” as the result of high “costs of
production and distribution of creative and innovative labors”).
211
See Johnson, supra note 8, at 668 (“[T]here is a behavioral-economic subsidy for corporations
undertaking endeavors that accord with human passions to invent, create, and contribute. The existence
of the intrinsic-motivation subsidy means that intrinsic motivation can be expected to cheapen the cost
of capital and labor for companies that are engaged in innovation and creative activity.”). This principle
is illustrated by an empirical study conducted by Scott Stern. The study found that graduating doctoral
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b. Beyond Financial Incentives
The research discussed above provides support for the
commercialization account by suggesting that economic incentives might
encourage individuals to undertake the more routine post-invention tasks
necessary to bring a product to market. But even though patents arguably
can be justified by the commercialization account, from a behavioral
perspective, patents might not be the only, or even the best, option for
encouraging commercialization activity.
i.

Encouraging Commercialization Through Internalization
and Integration

Additional motivation research suggests that while financial incentives
can indeed encourage individuals to undertake non-intrinsically motivating
tasks, the most effective means of incentivizing this work is through a
process wherein workers “internalize” and “integrate” the task—or in other
words, make it their own.212 Once a task—even one that is externally
prescribed, and that outside observers might consider boring or routine—
has been internalized and integrated, the quality of motivation the
performer feels resembles the quality of motivation experienced for
intrinsically motivating tasks. Extrinsic incentives are no longer
necessarily required to motivate the task’s performance.213
Psychologists have examined the means by which internalization and
integration of routine, mandatory tasks can be facilitated, and have
discovered three main determinants of this process. The first is relatedness,
or the need to feel connected to others.214 To the degree that this need can
be satisfied by undertaking non-intrinsically motivated behaviors—
because, for example, the behaviors are modeled by others to whom an
individual wishes to feel related—these behaviors are more likely to be
integrated and internalized.215 The second is perceived competence, or the
degree to which an individual feels that he can accomplish a given task
effectively.216 And the third and most important determinant of

students in biology were willing to accept a decrease in pay from industry employers if the employers
gave them the opportunity to engage in independent research and publishing. Scott Stern, Do Scientists
Pay to Be Scientists?, 50 MGMT. SCI. 835, 848–49 (2004).
212
Ryan & Deci, supra note 191, at 71.
213
See id. at 71–73.
214
Id. at 73.
215
Id. at 73; see also Richard M. Ryan et al., Representations of Relationships to Teachers,
Parents, and Friends as Predictors of Academic Motivation and Self-Esteem, 14 J. EARLY
ADOLESCENCE 226 (1994) (finding that children who had better connections with their parents and
teachers more fully internalized the regulated behaviors of school).
216
Ryan & Deci, supra note 191, at 73.
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internalization and integration is autonomy.
As the autonomy an
individual experiences in undertaking a task increases, the probability that
she will internalize and integrate the task also increases, and the quality of
motivation more closely resembles intrinsic motivation.218
Empirical studies also suggest that encouraging internalization and
integration of mandatory and routine tasks achieves more desirable
outcomes than incentivizing these tasks via external regulation and reward.
As these tasks become more internalized and integrated, a variety of
desirable outcomes, including greater interest and effort in, and enjoyment
and performance of, the tasks ensue.219 Conversely, lower internalization
and increased responsiveness to external regulation and reward results in
less interest and effort, greater anxiety, and increased blaming behavior.220
ii. Promoting Internalization and Integration
If, as commercialization theory proposes, the goal of a patent is to
motivate individuals to undertake commercialization activities, the
financial reward a patent offers is likely effective. But it might not be the
optimal way to achieve this goal. Instead, policymakers seeking to
encourage commercialization might achieve better success by facilitating
development and commercialization environments that are “autonomy
supportive”—that is, where the individuals involved feel related,
competent, and autonomous, and are therefore more likely to internalize
and integrate routine tasks.
Consistent with this conclusion are the results of an empirical study
that looked at motivation, effort, and performance of over 11,000
employees performing either research or development tasks in a range of
manufacturing and service sectors. According to the results of the study,
while intrinsic motivators played the most significant role in motivating
basic and applied research activity (which, as described above, one might
consider to be intrinsically motivating), employee independence was the
217
Id. at 70–73; see also Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual
Property Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1935, 1959 (2014) (discussing Ryan and Deci’s findings about
autonomy, competence, and relatedness).
218
Ryan & Deci, supra note 191, at 73.
219
See, e.g., id. at 73 (listing behavioral effectiveness, volitional persistence, enhanced wellbeing, and social assimilation as some of the advantages of greater internalization); James P. Connell &
James G. Wellborn, Competence, Autonomy, and Relatedness: A Motivational Analysis of Self-System
Processes, in MINNESOTA SYMPOSIUM ON CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 43, 51–52, 55 (M.R. Gunnar & L.A.
Sroufe eds., 1991); Marianne Miserandino, Children Who Do Well in School: Individual Differences in
Perceived Competence and Autonomy in Above-Average Children, 88 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 203, 208
(1996) (finding that children who feel more certain in their abilities and more autonomous perform
better in school).
220
Richard M. Ryan & James P. Connell, Perceived Locus of Causality and Internalization:
Examining Reasons for Acting in Two Domains, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 749, 755–56
(1989).
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most significant motivator of development or commercialization activity
(which one might consider to be less intrinsically motivating).221 Financial
reward, in the form of salary, had a lesser, positive effect on the
productivity of those engaged in either research or development.222
Facilitating autonomy-supportive commercialization environments
might seem like a vague and daunting task when compared to the
comparative simplicity of offering a financial reward. But this goal can be
achieved in surprisingly simple ways, such as providing individuals with a
meaningful rationale for their work, giving timely and appropriate
feedback, including variety in the tasks an individual is asked to perform,
and giving individuals opportunities to participate in professional
communities.223 Further, given the deadweight loss that inevitably results
from patent monopolies,224 these types of interventions might prove to be
less economically and socially costly than the current patent system.
Again, these findings from the motivation literature apply to
individuals and not necessarily to organizations. And it is reasonable to
assume that—perhaps to an even greater degree than for initial invention—
commercialization, which may not be intrinsically motivating and which
often requires specialized expertise, equipment, and other resources, is
largely undertaken by or in conjunction with firms.225 But the empirical
results discussed here do apply to individuals working for firms in the
context of an employer-employee relationship.226 Thus, to the extent that
firms—who are likely in the best position to do so—facilitate autonomysupportive environments for their employees, they will reap the reward of
lowered costs resulting from the employees’ improved motivation and
performance.
Whether this subsidy would be sufficient, in and of itself, to motivate
rational-actor firms to undertake commercialization activities is unclear.
The case of the pharmaceutical industry suggests perhaps not. But, at the
very least, increased firm awareness of the financial benefits flowing from
these interventions might allow us to decrease the economic reward needed
to encourage commercialization—through shortened patent terms, for
221
Henry Sauermann & Wesley M. Cohen, What Makes Them Tick? Employee Motives and Firm
Innovation, 56 MGMT. SCI. 2134, 2149–50 (2010).
222
Id. at 2149.
223
Edward L. Deci et al., Facilitating Internalization: The Self-Determination Theory
Perspective, 62 J. PERSONALITY 119 (1994); J. Richard Hackman & Greg R. Oldman, Motivation
Through the Design of Work: Test of a Theory, 16 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 250 (1976);
Stern, supra note 211, at 848.
224
Johnson, supra note 8, at 677; see also Sean C. Pippen, Dollars and Lives: Finding Balance in
the Patent “Gene Utility” Doctrine, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 208–09 (2006) (discussing how the
high transaction costs associated with patent licensing can impede research in the biotech industry).
225
See Stephen K. Markham, Moving Technologies from Lab to Market, 45 RES.-TECH. MGMT.
31, 31 (2002).
226
See Sauerman & Cohen, supra note 221, at 2149.

334

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:297

227

example. Under commercialization theory, to the extent monopolies can
be minimized while still maintaining optimal incentives to commercialize,
society benefits.
5. Patent Racing Theory
According to the patent racing account, a patent is not required to
incentivize invention in the first instance,228 but speeds the pace of
innovation as inventors working on the same problem race either to reap
the patent’s financial reward229 or avoid being taxed for practicing their
own invention.230 The psychology literature suggests that competition can
indeed enhance innovation under certain conditions. These conditions,
however, are not necessarily those our current patent system facilitates.
a. Motivation Research
The motivation research is relevant to patent racing theory. If, as this
research suggests, individuals need no external incentives to be creative
because they are intrinsically motivated to be so, we might assume that
these same individuals will not respond to external incentives designed to
speed the pace of their creative activity.231 It is possible, however, that the
competitive environment patent racing theory emphasizes changes the
calculus of motivation. An in-depth look at the psychology of competition
is thus in order.
b. Competition Research
The psychology literature examining the relationship between
competition and performance is complex. Two strains of competition
research informative for purposes of this Article are the literature
examining the relationship between competition and individual motivation
and the literature examining the relationship between competition and
individual goal setting.
i. Competition and Motivation
A number of studies have explored the effects of competition on
intrinsic motivation. An important conclusion is that competition, in
227
See Roin, supra note 187, at 750 (discussing the trade-offs between innovation and patent
length in various industries).
228
Supra Part II.A.5; see also Lemley, supra note 22, at 711–12 (discussing patent racing theory
and alternative patent theories).
229
Note that “wanting” a financial reward for an invention when the inventor would have
undertaken the challenge regardless of reward is different from requiring the financial reward as an
incentive to undertake the inventive process in the first place. While incentive theory posits the latter
scenario, patent racing theory proposes the former.
230
Lemley, supra note 22, at 755–56.
231
Id. at 758.
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certain contexts, can enhance intrinsic motivation. This is so because
winning plays an important informational role that increases an
individual’s perceived competence at a task.233
This finding, consistent with patent racing theory, suggests that
competition can indeed be beneficial for innovation. The right kind of
competition can enhance intrinsic motivation, and, as discussed earlier,
enhanced intrinsic motivation is associated with higher creativity and
better performance on a variety of tasks.234
It is not known, however, whether the current patent system offers the
“right” kind of competition for purposes of enhancing motivation and
creativity. The benefits of competition for intrinsic motivation do not
accrue when the context of the competition is construed by the competitor
as controlling—when there is high external pressure to win.235 If the
prospect of a financial reward causes firms and universities to impose
significant pressure on the inventors they employ, the competition induced
by a patent race might have detrimental effects on motivation and
innovation generally.
ii. Competition and Goal Setting
As discussed in the earlier analysis of prospect theory, when
individuals are time-constrained, they tend to set more difficult goals for
themselves and accomplish tasks more quickly.236 This finding also has
relevance for patent racing theory. If a competitive environment causes
individuals to feel time-constrained and set more difficult inventive goals
for themselves, a patent race might speed the pace of innovation as patent
racing theory postulates.
Supporting this hypothesis, an empirical study examining the
relationship between goal setting and competition concluded that
participants who set more difficult goals for themselves showed enhanced
232
Johnmarshall Reeve & Edward L. Deci, Elements of the Competitive Situation that Affect
Intrinsic Motivation, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 24, 30 (1996); see also Jennifer A.
Epstein & Judith M. Harackiewiecz, Winning Is Not Enough: The Effects of Competition and
Achievement Orientation on Intrinsic Interest, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 128 (1992)
(finding that competition can increase intrinsic motivation for achievement-oriented individuals);
Robert S. Weinberg & John Ragan, Effects of Competition, Success/Failure, and Sex on Intrinsic
Motivation, 50 RES. Q. 503, 508 (1979) (finding that individuals demonstrated increased intrinsic
motivation both at completion of the competition generally and when they succeeded at the
competition).
233
Reeve & Deci, supra note 232, at 30–32. As discussed above, perceived competence can
enhance feelings of intrinsic motivation. See Ryan & Deci, supra note 191, at 73; supra Part III.B.4.b.i.
234
See AMABILE, supra note 109, at 132–33. It should also be noted, however, that many studies
show that competition had the opposite effect, and that the effect of competition on creativity is
complex. Id. at 131–32, 150; see also Ryan & Deci, supra note 147, at 55.
235
Reeve & Deci, supra note 232, at 30–31.
236
Locke & Bryan, supra note 183; supra Part III.B.3.c.
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performance on a set of routine tasks. But the study also surprisingly
found that when individuals had already set goals, the additional presence
of competition did not enhance task performance, and in fact detracted
from it.238 The authors of the study hypothesized that the decreased
performance resulted from lowered concentration or increased anxiety in
the presence of competition.239
This study examined performance on routine arithmetic tasks rather
than the more difficult tasks one would expect to be associated with the
process of innovation.240 Nevertheless, its findings are consistent with the
idea that competition may be beneficial to the individual creative process
only under certain conditions—in particular, when the competition does
not impose undue external pressure on an individual that might interfere
with cognitive processes.
Also consistent with this conclusion is additional goal-setting research
that reveals the importance of framing. When a goal is presented as a
threat, with an emphasis on failing, performance is decreased compared to
when the same goal is presented as a challenge, with an emphasis on
success and the utility of the effort put in by the individual.241
The framing results are particularly relevant to the iteration of patent
racing theory in which the patent acts as a “stick” rather than a “carrot”—
where inventors race for a patent not because they want the reward, but
because they fear being excluded from practicing their own invention.242
Because framing goals as efforts to avoid failure decreases individual
performance, the “stick” model of patent racing might not be the optimal
way to enhance creativity and innovation.243
iii. Competition Conclusions
Overall, the competition research suggests that competition has
positive effects on innovation when it provides competence information
and allows for high goal setting, but detracts from innovation when it poses
a threat or results in a controlling situation.
One way to take advantage of the benefits of competition while
237
Donald J. Campbell & David M. Furrer, Goal Setting and Competition as Determinants of
Task Performance, 16 J. ORG. BEHAV. 377, 386 (1995).
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 381.
241
Edwin A. Locke & Gary P. Latham, New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory, 15 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 265, 266 (2006).
242
Lemley, supra note 22, at 755–56.
243
According to this view, the 2011 America Invents Act’s expansion of prior user rights under
35 U.S.C. § 273 was a positive development. Cf. Lemley, supra note 22, at 757 (arguing that the AIA’s
prior rights amendments might reduce racing incentives). By allowing parties who lose the patent race
to practice their inventions without penalty, this amendment reduces the threatening aspects of the race,
and helps ensure that any competition taking place is of the beneficial kind.
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avoiding its pitfalls would be to offer a primarily attributional reward,
where “winning” inventors are publicly announced. This attributional
system sets up positive competition for reputational gain and competence
feedback, but does not pose a threat of significant financial loss or give
employers reason to pressure inventors in ways that are detrimental to
creativity.
C. Psychology and Non-Utilitarian Accounts of the Patent System
As discussed above, behavioral research can illuminate utilitarian
accounts of the patent system by elucidating how people respond to
incentives in real-world scenarios.
In contrast, non-utilitarian accounts of patents are based largely on
deontological conceptions and generally do not depend on individuals
responding to incentives in particular ways. But behavioral work can still
serve as an important tool to evaluate these theories.
First, psychology research can elucidate the psychological salience of
various rights. Labor-desert theory, for example, justifies patent rights as a
just reward for an inventor’s hard work. Behavioral research can help us
understand how much inventors, and society at large, are concerned about
justice in this context. Research showing that these groups are anxious
about fairness could bolster labor-desert theory. Conversely, if research
suggests that a fair reward for innovative labor is not a consideration for
inventors or the general populace, we might question whether labor-desert
is a valid justification for strong intellectual property rights.
Second, and relatedly, behavioral findings can give us insights into the
consequences, good or bad, that might result if we honor or fail to honor
certain rights deemed important by deontologists. If negative consequences
flow from a failure to honor these rights, the case for granting them may be
strengthened; but if not granting the rights does not result in measurable
psychological or behavioral harm, or if granting the rights actually causes
harm, we may again question the utility of these rights.
Admittedly, this line of analysis puts a consequentialist spin on nonutilitarian theories because it seeks to justify or discredit these theories on
the basis of their psychological and behavioral consequences. The
approach is consistent with the practical focus of this Article, which, as
mentioned above, seeks to harness the behavioral literature to develop an
intellectual property regime that maximizes social value (broadly defined)
while minimizing social costs. Not everyone will agree with this approach;
a non-utilitarian theorist might argue, for example, that we should honor an
inventor’s personality rights regardless of whether the inventor (or society
as a whole) cares about them and even if doing so leads on balance to
social harm, because it is the morally correct thing to do. Although this
Article adopts a different view, it does not seek to challenge this argument.
Behavioral research can be used to evaluate non-utilitarian theories in a
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third way, arguably useful even to those who reject any attempts to
evaluate the theories on consequentialist grounds. This is to determine
whether our current system honors the interests implicated by nonutilitarian theories in a psychologically salient way, and, if not, to give
insights into how this might best be done. For example, behavioral
research could help us determine whether inventors’ personality interests
are best honored through a monetary award, attribution, ongoing control
over works, a combination of these, or something else. Though the existing
behavioral literature does not definitively answer all of the types of
questions discussed here that it could potentially answer, it does shed light
on some of them, as I now discuss.
1. Labor-Desert Theory
The labor-desert account envisions a patent as a reward for the labor an
inventor invests in her creation.244 A proviso to this theory is that a patent
should not be granted when doing so harms others,245 generally understood
in the patent context as inappropriately excluding others from the public
domain.246
a. Fairness Research
The labor-desert theory implicates notions of fairness. We grant a
patent to an inventor because she has earned natural rights in her invention,
and it is thus the just thing to do.
Ample psychological evidence supports the idea that humans feel
strongly about fairness.247 Babies as young as fifteen months old favor
experimenters who distribute toys evenly over those who do not.248
Children as young as three take merit into consideration when asked to
distribute stickers.249 And when placed in a game situation, adult subjects
are much happier when they receive a financial reward they perceive as

244

MERGES, supra note 67, at 32–33; see also supra Part III.B.1.
Moore, supra note 71, at 78–79.
246
E.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 456.
247
Many scientists in fact believe that our preference for fairness is an evolutionary trait that is
hard-wired into our systems. See, e.g., L. SUN, THE FAIRNESS INSTINCT: THE ROBIN HOOD MENTALITY
AND OUR BIOLOGICAL NATURE 49 (2013) (“Driven by our fairness instinct, we keep watchful eyes on
all sorts of violations of fairness rules in our daily lives. . . . Our subconscious emotional response in
these common scenarios indicates that a preference for fairness may be deeply ingrained in our DNA.
This hypothesis has gained much support from scientific studies in recent years.”).
248
Monica P. Burns & Jennifer A. Sommerville, “I Pick You”: The Impact on Fairness and Race
on Infants’ Selection of Social Partners, 5 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1, 6 (2014).
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Patricia Kanngiesser & Felix Warneken, Young Children Consider Merit when Distributing
Resources with Others, PLOS ONE (Aug. 29, 2012), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=1
0.1371/journal.pone.0043979 [http://perma.cc/83XF-JF8S].
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fair than when they receive the same reward but perceive it to be unfair.250
When these subjects’ brains were scanned, the authors of this latter study
found that accepting the “fair” reward activated centers of the brain
normally associated with reward.251 Conversely, accepting the “unfair”
reward activated centers of the brain associated with self-control,
suggesting that to accept the reward, an individual had to overcome the
strong negative emotions associated with unfair treatment.252
b. Fairness and Innovation
More specifically for purposes of this Article, empirical results suggest
that our basic drive towards fairness extends to rewards for innovative
behavior. For example, a study by Onne Janssen concluded that employees
engage in more innovative work behaviors in response to job demands
when they perceive the rewards reaped from their efforts to be fair versus
unfair.253 In a later study, Janssen found that employees find innovation
stressful when fairness is low.254 The latter finding is significant because
excess stress is known to have adverse effects on performance and
motivation.255
c. Supporting Labor-Desert
These findings generally support, on consequentialist grounds, the
labor-desert account of patent law.256 Ignoring the fairness considerations
labor-desert theory implicates may result in both psychological and
innovative harms, while honoring them may promote innovative

250
Golnaz Tabibnia et al., The Sunny Side of Fairness: Preference for Fairness Activates Reward
Circuitry (and Disregarding Unfairness Activates Self-Control Circuitry), 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 339, 341
(2008).
251
Id. at 342. These same centers are activated when an individual partakes in good food, sex, or
mood-enhancing drugs. E.g., Kenneth Blum et al., Sex, Drugs, and Rock ‘N’ Roll: Hypothesizing
Common Mesolimbic Activation as a Function of Reward Gene Polymorphisms, 44 J. PSYCHOACTIVE
DRUGS 38, 39 (2012).
252
Tabibnia et al., supra note 250, at 343–44.
253
Onne Janssen, Job Demands, Perceptions of Effort-Reward Fairness and Innovative Work
Behaviour, 73 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 287, 297 (2000).
254
Onne Janssen, How Fairness Perceptions Make Innovative Behavior More or Less Stressful,
25 J. ORG. BEHAV. 201, 209 (2004).
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See generally STRESS AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE (James E. Driskell & Eduardo Salas eds.,
2013).
256
The notion that a preference for fairness may be “hard-wired” into our systems might also help
explain why, though fairness is not an explicit aspect of patent law, congressional and judicial attitudes
toward intellectual property rights often implicitly reflect fairness concerns. See supra Part II.B.1;
sources cited supra note 74. Moreover, empirical work by Gregory Mandel suggests that a large
segment of the population believes that intellectual property exists to protect inventors’ natural rights in
their creations. Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L. REV.
261, 287 (2014).
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behaviors.
Designing a legal environment that creators and the public perceive as
fair may not necessarily require granting financial rewards to inventors,
however. In the study finding a positive relationship between innovative
behavior and perceived fairness, the questionnaire meant to unearth notions
of fairness did not explicitly reference financial compensation.258 Instead, it
arguably focused more on attributional than financial concerns, asking
subjects to agree or disagree with such statements as “I give a great deal of
time and attention to the organization, but get very little appreciation”; “I
put more energy into my job than it is worth”; and “I feel unfairly treated
in my job.”259 Consistent with earlier conclusions of this Article, then, an
attributional reward might help achieve many of the proposed goals of the
patent system, including, in this case, the satisfaction of fairness
considerations.260 Notably, a purely attributional reward would also satisfy
the “no-harm” proviso that labor-desert theory mandates, because it would
not remove inventions from the public domain.
2. Personality Theory
Personality theory holds that an inventor has a personality interest in
his discovery that merits protection.261 Although there is surprisingly little
empirical research testing this claim, preliminary work does seem to
support the idea of a personality interest in creation. 262
a. Feelings of Ownership and Valuation
Many inventors engage in creative work primarily to satisfy a need for
self-expression.263 More specifically, a qualitative study of employees
working at a video game design studio concluded that these individuals do
in fact experience a feeling of psychological ownership over their
innovative work product.264 Empirical work by Christopher Buccafusco
and Christopher Sprigman further suggests that creators of intrinsically
motivated work may value their creations more highly than those of works
257
See generally Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright
Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming).
258
Janssen, supra note 253, at 291–92.
259
Id.
260
Jeanne Fromer has also argued that an attributional award could help advance the fairness and
personality interests implicated by the creative process. Fromer, supra note 75, at 1791–98.
261
See supra Part II.B.2.
262
Elizabeth Rouse, Kill Your Darlings? Experiencing, Maintaining, and Changing Psychological
Ownership in Creative Work 4–5 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College),
http://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:101452 [https://perma.cc/9GZP-GR8W].
263
Fromer, supra note 75, at 1771–72 & n.152 (citing JOSEPH ROSSMAN, INDUSTRIAL
CREATIVITY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INVENTOR 200 (1964)); Sauermann & Cohen, supra note 221,
at 2134.
264
Rouse, supra note 262, at 3.
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that are not intrinsically motivated.

b. Effects of Relinquishing Control
If a personality interest in invention is a real psychological
phenomenon, it is useful from a consequentialist perspective to determine
what negative effects, if any, flow from the failure to validate this interest.
A recent study by On Amir and Orly Lobel suggests that loss of
control over intellectual work product might result in decreased motivation
and performance.266 The study measured task performance in a group of
subjects under restrictions that caused them to relinquish ownership of
their work product and limited their future ability to perform the same task
in other contexts. Compared to a control group under no such restrictions,
these subjects spent less time and were less focused on the tasks, and
committed twice as many performance errors.267
These negative effects were less pronounced when subjects were asked
to perform what the authors classified as a “creative” task (a wordassociation activity) versus a task classified as purely effort-based
(searching matrices for numbers adding up to ten).268 The study’s authors
hypothesized that the intrinsic motivation presumably triggered by the
creative task served to mitigate the negative effects flowing from loss of
ownership.269
This latter finding raises an interesting question for personality theory.
Legal scholars writing in a personality theory vein have suggested that
personality rights are particularly important for creative works.270 Going
further, Justin Hughes argues that more expressive creative works, i.e.,
artistic pursuits, are more deserving of personality rights than less
expressive works, i.e., scientific inventions.271
But though it might be true that an individual’s ownership interest is
stronger for more creative versus less creative work,272 Amir and Lobel’s
265
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 31, 46 (2011).
266
On Amir & Orly Lobel, How Noncompetes Stifle Performance, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb.
2014, at 26.
267
Id.; see also Orly Lobel, Op-Ed., My Ideas, My Boss’s Property, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/my-ideas-my-bosss-property.html (arguing that when
corporations force their inventors to pre-assign their intellectual property, inventors lose their “creative
fire” and produce fewer inventor-owned patents).
268
Amir & Lobel, supra note 266.
269
Id.
270
Fromer, supra note 75, at 1754; Hughes, supra note 70, at 340–43.
271
Sources cited supra note 270.
272
Although, as discussed in Part III.C.2.a, supra, preliminary evidence shows that creative works
invoke feelings of psychological ownership, there is no empirical evidence to support or refute
Hughes’s additional hypothesis: that artistic works invoke stronger feelings of psychological ownership
and intrinsic motivation than scientific works. In the motivation literature, both scientific and artistic
pursuits are considered to be creative and intrinsically motivating; and, as mentioned already, there is
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study suggests that the negative effects on innovation flowing from loss of
this ownership are lower for more creative versus less creative work, due
to the mitigating effects of intrinsic motivation. If, as Jeanne Fromer has
recommended, our aim is to administer personality rights within a
utilitarian framework, such that personality rights are granted only if the
benefits outweigh the costs,273 this finding suggests that personality rights
may be less desirable for more creative and therefore more intrinsically
motivating works.274
c. Implementing Personality Theory
If, for whatever reason, we decide that a patent system that respects
personality rights is justified, then the question becomes how to
accomplish this task. Fromer and Hughes have each suggested that the
personality interests of inventors can be satisfied, at least in part, by
granting attribution rights.275
The conceptual relationship between labor-desert theory and
personality theory also suggests that attribution might go a long way
towards satisfying personality interests. Psychologists have conceptualized
the personality interest individuals feel in their creations as the result of the
“efforts, time, and attention” invested in them.276 Thus, to the extent that
empirical results support the use of attribution for satisfying labor-desert
concerns,277 they might also support the same approach for satisfying
personality concerns.
Because the personality interest conceives of an invention as the
little empirical research examining personality interests in creative works of any kind. One study from
the motivation literature examining levels of motivation in a variety of high school courses found the
highest levels of motivation in art and computer science classes—but this was likely related to the
relatively high level of active participation in these classes compared to more passive lecture-based
courses like Math and English. David J. Shernoff et al., Student Engagement in High School
Classrooms from the Perspective of Flow Theory, 18 SCH. PSYCHOL. Q. 158, 170 (2003).
273
Fromer, supra note 75, at 1779.
274
This conclusion is consistent with my earlier conclusion that while incentives to innovate
might not be required for the intrinsically motivating work of creation, they might be needed for the
less intrinsically motivating work of implementation and commercialization. See supra Parts III.B.1,
III.B.4. Of course, we might also decide that personality rights are important, not because an economic
analysis concludes that they will have positive effects on innovation, but simply because we believe,
from a deontological perspective, that an inventor has a right to such protection.
275
Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790–92; Hughes, supra note 70, at 349; see also Rosenblatt, supra
note 5, at 457. Fromer, for example, cites empirical evidence suggesting that creators will accept lower
license fees for their works in exchange for attribution. Fromer, supra note 75, at 1791 (citing
Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value of
Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1415–16 (2013)).
276
Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139, 144 (1988);
see also MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS:
DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 248–49 (1981). Legal theorists have also noted the similarities
between the personality and fairness theories. See Fromer, supra note 75, at 1753.
277
See supra Part III.C.1.b.
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extension of its creator, however, it implicates issues of control that the
labor-desert account does not.278 Amir and Lobel’s empirical study
indirectly279 suggests that ongoing control may be an important
motivator—although it seems to be less important when the work is
intrinsically motivating, as most inventive work is.280
But granting inventors lasting control over their creations might have
detrimental effects on innovation, for example by stifling user innovation
or improvements. If we take a consequentialist approach to implementing
personality theory, we might ask whether the benefits we hope to gain
from granting inventors lasting control over their inventions (measured, for
example, in increased motivations to invent or increased societal wellbeing) are worth the costs (measured, for example, in decreased follow-on
innovation). Another possibility involves granting a limited control—like
that codified in the Visual Artists Rights Act—that gives inventors, for
example, the right to prevent the unauthorized use of their name in
conjunction with modified works.281
3. Social Planning Theory
Social planning theory posits that patent rules should be structured so
as to promote a “just and attractive culture,”282 as measured by a range of
metrics beyond economic welfare. Scholars have proposed a number of
values to be taken into consideration, and have hypothesized how
intellectual property rights—particularly in the copyright and publicity
contexts—might be structured to advance these values.283
Social planning theory is not so much a justification of the current
patent system as it is an aspirational statement about how intellectual
property rights ideally should be structured. Scholars working in this vein
have proposed that the patent system should promote the values of
autonomy, culture, democracy, equality, development, creativity,
community, happiness, respect, and opportunities for meaningful work and
self-determination.284

278

Fromer, supra note 75, at 1770; Hughes, supra note 70, at 344.
The study does not directly investigate the effects of lack of control. The restricted subjects
transferred ownership of their work product and could not perform similar tasks for others in the future.
Although the transfer of ownership necessarily entailed relinquishment of control, the loss of
motivation associated with the transfer might have been due to the loss of attribution the transfer
entailed or the inability to continue working on tasks the workers enjoyed.
280
Amir & Lobel, supra note 266.
281
See supra Part II.B.2.
282
Fisher, supra note 1, at 171–72.
283
See supra Part III.B.3.
284
See Fisher, supra note 87, at 1687; Sunder, supra note 88, at 324–25.
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a. Social Planning Values and Well-Being
Social planning theorists’ assertion that the above-listed values will
contribute to the “just and attractive culture” that is the stated goal of the
theory is largely supported by the empirical literature. In particular, there is
a robust psychology literature demonstrating that the values of
autonomy,285 competence,286 engagement in meaningful work,287 selfexpression,288 and community289 are positively related to measures of well285
Marc R. Blais et al., Toward a Motivational Model of Couple Happiness, 59 J. PERSONALITY.
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1021, 1021–22, 1027, 1030 (1990); Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The
“What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 227, 231–34, 241–43, 253, 263 (2000); C. Raymond Knee et al., SelfDetermination and Conflict in Romantic Relationships, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 997,
997–1000 (2005); Harry T. Reis et al., Daily Well-Being: The Role of Autonomy, Competence, and
Relatedness, 26 SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 419, 424 (2000); Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, On
Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being, 52
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 141, 156–57, 159–61 (2001); Richard M. Ryan et al., On the Interpersonal
Regulation of Emotions: Emotional Reliance Across Gender, Relationships, and Cultures, 12 PERS.
RELATIONSHIPS 145, 149 (2005); see also Reed W. Larson, Toward a Psychology of Positive Youth
Development, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 170, 170 (2000); Richard M. Ryan et al., The Significance of
Autonomy and Autonomy Support in Psychological Development and Psychopathology, in
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: THEORY AND METHOD 795, 802 (Dante Cicchetti & Donald J.
Cohen eds., 2006) [hereinafter Ryan et al., The Significance of Autonomy].
286
Tim Kasser & Richard M. Ryan, A Dark Side of the American Dream: Correlates of Financial
Success as a Central Life Aspiration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 410, 420 (1993); Tim
Kasser & Richard M. Ryan, Further Examining the American Dream: Differential Correlates of
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 280, 280 (1996); Reis et al.,
supra note 285, at 424; Kennon M. Sheldon & Tim Kasser, Coherence and Congruence: Two Aspects
of Personality Integration, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 531 (1995); see also Ryan et al.,
The Significance of Autonomy, supra note 285, at 832; Martin E.P. Seligman, Positive Psychotherapy,
61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 774, 776–77 (2006).
287
Amy Love Collins et al., Flow and Happiness in Later Life: An Investigation into the Role of
Daily and Weekly Flow Experiences, 10 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 703, 704 (2009); Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi & Jeremy Hunter, Happiness in Everyday Life: The Uses of Experience Sampling, 4
J. HAPPINESS STUD. 185, 186, 194 (2003); Jeanne Nakamura & Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Concept
of Flow, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 90 (C.R. Snyder & Shane Lopez eds., 2002);
Seligman, supra note 286, at 777; Anne J. Wells, Self-Esteem and Optimal Experience, in OPTIMAL
EXPERIENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FLOW IN CONSCIOUSNESS 327 (Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi
& Isabella Csikszentmihalyi eds., 1988).
288
See Sherry L. Dupuis & Bryan J.A. Smale, An Examination of Relationship Between
Psychological Well-Being and Depression and Leisure Activity Participation Among Older Adults, 18
LOISIR ET SOCIÉTÉ 67 (1995); Ana Puig et al., The Efficacy of Creative Arts Therapies to Enhance
Emotional Expression, Spirituality, and Psychological Well-Being of Newly Diagnosed Stage I and
Stage II Breast Cancer Patients: A Preliminary Study, 33 ARTS PSYCHOTHERAPY 218, 224 (2006)
(finding that creative arts therapy intervention enhanced psychological well-being in subjects); Kennon
M. Sheldon et al., Trait Self and True Self: Cross-Role Variation in the Big-Five Personality Traits
with Psychological Authenticity and Subjective Well-Being, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1380, 1380 (1997) (finding that increased opportunities for authenticity and self-expression led to more
agreeableness, openness, and greater satisfaction in employment).
289
See, e.g., Ellen Berscheid & Harry T. Reis, Interpersonal Attraction and Close Relationships,
in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 1998); see also ANGUS CAMPBELL
ET AL., THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN LIFE: PERCEPTIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND SATISFACTIONS (1976);
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being and flourishing.
b. Social Planning Values and Innovation
Perhaps more salient to those with a welfarist bent, some of the values
social planning theory seeks to promote are also related to positive
innovation outcomes. For example, autonomy increases intrinsic
motivation, which in turn enhances creative output.290 Feelings of
competence are related to higher academic achievement.291 And
opportunities for self-expression and community may also lead to
increased intrinsic motivation.292 These values should thus be of interest to
anyone concerned with promoting creativity and innovative behavior.
c. Social Planning—Prescriptions
As discussed throughout this Article, the financial reward a patent
offers does not necessarily enhance creative output or motivations to
innovate. But as my analysis in this Part suggests, promoting values
consistent with a “just and attractive culture” may benefit society generally
through enhanced well-being and specifically through incentives to
innovate.
As far as the innovation-enhancing benefits of these principles are
concerned, to the extent that innovation happens in private organizations,
employers might be in the best position to promote them.293 Even if firms
as a whole behave like rational actors, they have a financial incentive to
endorse these values, since they can expect gains in productivity and
creative output from their employees as a result.
For innovation that takes place in the academic setting, policy reforms
that ensure research funding is administered in a way that promotes, rather
Reed W. Larson & Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, The Experience Sampling Method, 15 NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 41 (1983); Reis et al., supra note 285, at 420; Wolfgang
Stroebe & Margaret Stroebe, The Social Psychology of Social Support, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 597 (E. Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996).
290
See Teresa M. Amabile, The Social Psychology of Creativity: A Componential
Conceptualization, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 364 (1983) (finding that the positive
effects of autonomy on motivation are strengthened when the task is a creative one); Marylène Gagné
& Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and Work Motivation, 26 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
331, 342, 355 (2005) (finding that job motivation and performance are positively related to autonomy
support by managers); see also supra Part III.B.4.b.
291
Hyungshim Jang et al., Can Self-Determination Theory Explain What Underlies the
Productive, Satisfying Learning Experiences of Collectivistically Oriented Korean Students, 101 J.
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 644, 644 (2009) (finding that experiences of autonomy, competence, and relatedness
led to better learning outcomes in Korean students).
292
See Ryan & Connell, supra note 220, at 749; Sheldon & Kasser, supra note 286, at 534
(finding that increased opportunities for authenticity and self-expression led to enhanced intrinsic
motivation in employment); see also supra Part III.B.4.b (analyzing the role of relatedness in
improving intrinsic motivation).
293
See supra Part III.B.4.b.

346

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:297

than detracts from, the innovation-enhancing principles of autonomy,
engagement, community, and so on, are in order. For example, the research
funding structure could promote community by offering funds for
collaborative research projects.294 And the funding scheme could be
administered in such a way that academic researchers have more autonomy
to choose the particular projects that interest them, even if these projects
present a greater scientific or financial risk.295
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Though by no means comprehensive, the above analysis provides a
starting point for evaluating the various accounts of the patent system from
a behavioral perspective. This analysis can help us determine whether the
patent system is justified under any account, and can give us ideas for
building a patent system that accomplishes more of what we want it to
accomplish. Here, I summarize the results and discuss some of their
implications.
A. Commercialization Theory
1. Support from Psychology
From a purely behavioral perspective, my analysis suggests that
commercialization theory provides the strongest justification for a system
that, like ours, provides a primarily financial reward.296 While the early
creative steps of the innovative process are intrinsically motivating and
may be harmed rather than helped by an external financial reward,297 an
economic reward is likely of some use for incentivizing the more routine
and
structured
tasks
associated
with
implementation
and
294
Promoting collaborative and, in particular, interdisciplinary research projects would be
expected to result in additional gains in innovation. See supra Part III.B.3.b.
295
A recent popular press article tells the story of two academic research scientists who left their
careers because they felt constrained by the current funding scheme that allowed them to work only on
conservative and incremental research. Richard Harris, When Scientists Give Up, NPR (Sept. 9, 2014,
4:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/09/09/345289127/when-scientists-give-up. This is an
extreme example of lost motivation that can occur when autonomy is curtailed. On the positive side,
when researchers are given the autonomy to work on what interests them, we might expect enhanced
creative output. In a story about a researcher who received “very special funding from the National
Institutes of Health . . . that g[ave him] unbridled funds for [him] to do anything [he] s[aw] fit,” the
researcher explained that this funding “really emboldened [his group] to explore very new directions.”
Jon Hamilton, A Scientist Deploys Light and Sound to Reveal the Brain, NPR (July 27, 2015, 3:57
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/07/27/425068015/a-scientist-deploys-light-andsound-to-reveal-the-brain.
296
See supra Part III.B.4. It should be noted that this conclusion rests entirely on my analysis of
the psychology literature and does not take into account the many economic arguments advanced for
and against commercialization theory.
297
Id.

2015]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PATENT PROTECTION

347

298

commercialization.
Further, though this Article focuses primarily on individual-level
psychological factors rather than firm-level dynamics, the
commercialization phase of innovation may—due to financing and
equipment requirements and economies of scale—be more likely to require
participation from a large firm.299 To the extent that these firms behave
more like rational actors and less like individuals subject to psychological
forces, a financial reward might be required to incentivize
commercialization decisions that take place primarily at the organizational
level.
This latter dynamic might change over time as technological advances
make it easier for individuals and small groups to undertake
commercialization on their own.300 Johnson has made a similar point and
provides the example of home recording systems that make it much easier
for individuals to produce music without the involvement of expensive
studios.301 Another recent example is the 3-D printer, which allows
individuals to self-produce a number of products of their own design.302 As
these technologies proliferate and become cheaper, reduced financial
incentives, in conjunction with more effective kinds of individual-level
behavioral incentives, may be in order.
2. Structuring Commercialization
Assuming for the present that some financial incentive is required to
encourage commercialization, how should a patent system designed for
this purpose be structured? Though our current system likely meets the
goals of commercialization theory more effectively than those of any other
theory, a system specifically designed to foster commercialization would
diverge in important ways from our present regime. Sichelman, in his call
for a new commercialization patent, discusses in some detail what a
commercialization patent might look like in terms of scope and
patentability requirements.303 And as Roin has suggested, a
commercialization-focused scheme could be tailored so that products
requiring more time (and, consequently, more time engaged in routine
work) and resources to be brought to market are granted a proportionally

298

Id.
Id.
300
Johnson, supra note 8, at 672–75.
301
Id.
302
See generally Lucas Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public: Three-Dimensional Printing
Technology and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811 (2014) (identifying and analyzing the implications
of 3-D printing technology for copyright law).
303
Sichelman, supra note 45, at 400–11.
299
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B. Other Theories
In contrast to commercialization theory, the behavioral literature
suggests that a financial incentive may not be the most effective means of
achieving the ends and means put forth by the other accounts of the patent
system.
The intrinsic motivation literature, for example, suggests that external
financial incentives may not be helpful for motivating individuals to either
engage in creative behavior (as incentive theory posits)305 or share the
results of their efforts (as disclosure theory posits).306 Although the
literature suggests that competition can enhance creative performance
under certain conditions (as patent racing theory proposes),307 the current
patent system, which poses a threat of potentially significant financial
harm to the loser of a patent race, likely does not satisfy these
conditions.308
Though psychology research suggests that desert, personality, and
social planning values are significant human concerns which, if respected,
have the potential to promote innovative behavior,309 there is little evidence
to suggest that a financial reward is the best, or even an effective, way to
satisfy these concerns.
The account that garners the least support from the behavioral
literature is prospect theory.310 Research studying the effects of
collaboration, goal-setting, and cognitive limitations on creative
performance suggests that granting a broad patent to a single actor in order
to allow the actor to exploit the field is likely counterproductive for
innovation. This finding is consistent with economic criticisms of prospect
theory,311 and suggests that prospect theory be abandoned as a viable
approach to patent law.
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Roin, supra note 187.
See supra Part III.B.1.
306
See supra Part III.B.2.
307
See supra Part III.B.5.
308
See Locke & Latham, supra note 241, at 266.
309
The behavioral literature itself supports this utilitarian spin on the non-utilitarian patent
theories. Some proponents of these theories, taking a rights-based approach, would argue that these
values should be promoted regardless of the utilitarian outcome. While this might be true, it is also true,
according to the behavioral literature, that promoting these values in the innovation context likely will
have positive effects on innovation. See, e.g., supra Part III.C.3.b.
310
See id.
311
See, e.g., Lemley, The Economics of Improvement, supra note 166, at 1048–58 (criticizing
prospect theory on economic grounds).
305
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C. The Importance of Attribution
The idea of attribution is not new: a number of intellectual property
scholars have argued that attribution should play a more prominent role in
the intellectual property system.312 But one of the more striking results to
come from this analysis is the extent to which an attribution right has the
potential to achieve many of the goals proposed by disparate accounts of
the patent system.
Empirical research, for example, suggests that the reputational and
feedback benefits flowing from attribution are significant motivators of
disclosure—the means to promoting innovation set forth by disclosure
theory.313 A primarily attributional reward could also create the “right”
kind of competitive scenario that has the potential to speed the pace of
innovation, consistent with racing theory.314 For non-utilitarian accounts of
the patent system, empirical research suggests that an attributional reward
could go a long way towards satisfying inventors’ natural rights and
personality concerns.315
Moreover, attributional rewards are not necessarily inconsistent with
the commercialization-focused rewards described above. According to the
behavioral research, the goals we can hope to achieve via attribution—
namely, motivating disclosure and productive competition and satisfying
desert and personality concerns—are generally associated with the early,
creative phases of innovation rather than the later implementation
phases.316 A two-track patent system similar to that proposed by
Sichelman, with separate rewards317 offered for the creative and
commercialization phases of innovation, could take advantage of this
insight. Under my proposal, however, the first track would focus on
attribution, rather than a financial reward, for early-stage creation. The
second track would aim to promote commercialization through a
commercialization patent.318
312
E.g., Fromer, supra note 75, at 1790; Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at 478–79. But cf. Sprigman et
al., supra note 275, at 1415–16 (proposing caution in strengthening attribution rights).
313
See supra Part III.B.2.
314
See supra Part III.B.5.
315
See supra Part III.C.1–2.
316
See supra Part II.
317
See Fromer, supra note 75, at 1780 (discussing the possibility of splitting the bundle of rights
to provide for financial and attributional components). In contrast to my suggestion of splitting the
reward based on the phase of the innovation process, Fromer suggests granting attributional rights at
the individual level and granting financial rewards at the firm level.
318
As discussed above, financial rewards may be effective for motivating individuals to engage in
the routine activities associated with commercialization, and are also likely effective for motivating
large rational-actor firms who may play a more prominent role in the commercialization phase of
innovation. To fully satisfy commercialization theory, then, the financial reward might itself be split
such that key contributing employees at large firms receive a proportion of the monetary reward
awarded to the commercializing firm.
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To be optimally effective, an attributional reward granted at the early
stages of innovation must achieve the motivating ends of reputational
enhancement, positive competition, and competence feedback suggested
by the behavioral literature. The current patent system, which provides for
minimal attribution by listing inventors on patents that may or may not be
read by a wide audience, is likely insufficient for these purposes.319
Instead, a thoughtfully tailored attributional reward could involve periodic
announcements or press releases providing inventor biographies and
summarizing their inventions. A more sophisticated system might operate
in a manner similar to the scientific publication process, with inventions
evaluated for quality and scientific impact by a committee or an inventor’s
peers; inventions deemed more significant would receive some special
treatment designed to enhance reputational effects—wider circulation, for
example, or an interview with the popular press. This type of system would
provide inventors with a positive competitive goal as well as reputation
feedback,320 and would also help satisfy natural rights and personality
concerns by giving inventors credit and acclaim for their work.321
An attributional reward, though low-cost compared to our current
patent system, might bear its own price. Empirical work by Christopher
Sprigman and colleagues suggests that strengthening attribution in the
intellectual property context might increase transaction costs because
creators value attribution more highly where it is granted as a default right.
This makes it more difficult to bargain with creators for the use of their
creations without attribution.322 But these costs need not be implicated if
attribution is structured as described above, such that the inventor is
credited once, in a very public way, rather than every time the product is
used.
D. Beyond Patents
Besides attribution, behavioral research suggests that additional nonfinancial interventions may have positive effects on innovation. In
particular, the research highlighted in my discussions of commercialization
and social planning theory above underscores the importance of facilitating
innovative environments that promote autonomy, competence, relatedness,
and self-expression323—what psychologists refer to as “autonomysupportive” environments.324 In the context of commercialization theory,
this research suggests that facilitating these environments can be even
319

See Fromer, supra note 75, at 1792.
See supra Parts II.B.5, III.B.2.
321
See supra Parts II.C.2, III.C.1.
322
Sprigman et al., supra note 275, at 1430–32.
323
See supra Parts III.B.4, III.C.3.
324
Ryan & Deci, supra note 191, at 73–74.
320
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more effective than financial rewards for motivating individuals to engage
in the routine work that often accompanies commercialization.325 In the
context of social planning theory, this research suggests that facilitating
these environments can have positive effects on creative output.326
It is thus worth thinking about what can be done at various levels to
promote autonomy-supportive environments. In the case of the innovative
behavior that takes place in private firms, the firms themselves may be in
the best position to facilitate these environments.327 Because firms stand to
gain financially through increased productivity and higher quality output
from making these changes, educating them about the potential benefits
might be sufficient to effect positive change.
For innovative behavior that takes place in publically funded
institutions such as universities, drafting funding policies that give
researchers autonomy in project choice and provide opportunities for
collaborative work could prove beneficial.328 Universities themselves, as
employers, could also undertake initiatives designed to enhance the
autonomy, competence, and relatedness of their researchers.
For innovative behavior that takes place on an unstructured level, we
are currently seeing the rise of autonomy-supportive innovation
environments—featuring the key components of autonomy, relatedness,
self-expression, and competence feedback—on the internet.329
Communities and governments can also do their part to facilitate these
environments by providing informational (e.g., listings of groups with
shared interests) or physical (e.g., meeting places) resources to innovationminded individuals.
E. Caveats
Before concluding, two caveats of this work must be reiterated. First,
the conclusions drawn here are based entirely on behavioral research and
do not take into account the various economic or rights arguments that
have been advanced for and against the various accounts of the patent
system. Nevertheless, this analysis is not necessarily mutually exclusive of,
or inconsistent with, these other types of arguments.330 Future efforts could
integrate these arguments with other strains of analysis.
325

See supra Part III.B.4.
See supra Part III.C.3.
327
See supra Part III.B.4.b.ii.
328
See supra Part III.C.3.c.
329
See John Quiggin & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
203, 204 (2008) (relating the rise of amateur production of information and innovation to the
availability of free or quasi-free distributional channels, the most significant of which is the internet).
330
See Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 8, at 857 (arguing that a socio-historical approach to patent law
can complement more traditional approaches).
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Second, the analysis here focuses primarily on the level of individual
incentives, while a significant amount of innovative behavior currently
occurs in the context of organizations. The general response to this is twofold. First, organizations are made up of individuals.331 To the extent that
individuals within organizations are motivated by non-financial
considerations, firms benefit from lower costs and higher productivity, and
the corresponding financial reward necessary to incentivize the
(presumably) rational-actor employer should be lowered.332 Second, as
technology improves, more avenues for innovation and commercialization
are opening to individuals.333 Thus, individual-level incentives may be
poised to gain greater salience over time.
Of course, more work can be done to determine the answers to
questions such as: How closely do firm-level behavioral incentives track
individual incentives? Do firm incentives change as a function of firm
size? How do individual-level and firm-level behavioral incentives
interact? As the answers to these questions are clarified, we can tailor the
patent system so as to bring it more fully in line with the behavior of actors
within the system, thereby minimizing the system’s social costs.
V. CONCLUSION
As shown here, research from the behavioral sciences provides a tool
for measuring theoretical accounts of the patent system against the
expected behaviors of actors responding to the system in real life. It thus
helps us answer the pressing question of whether patent rights are justified,
and if so, for what purpose. My analysis here suggests that, at least
according to the behavioral literature, our current patent system is best
justified as a means of promoting commercialization activities.
Beyond this, the Article also demonstrates that a behavioral framework
can bring us closer to an ideal patent system—one that promotes
innovation through mechanisms like disclosure and competition while at
the same time satisfying moral concerns like justice and personality
interests. My analysis suggests that this can be accomplished by
developing a patent system that offers attributional and financial rewards at
different times to different actors in a manner that takes advantage of the
psychological factors that govern the innovation process.
Finally, the behavioral analysis undertaken here provides support for
broad interventions outside the traditional patent system—including
changes to our approach to research funding—to foster innovationsupportive environments. All of these insights, taken together, have the
331

See supra Part III.B.4.a.
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See supra Part IV.A.1.
332

2015]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PATENT PROTECTION

353

potential to direct innovation policy in ways that align more closely with
the realities of human creativity and decision-making.

